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Abstract 
Recent events such as SQL Slammer and Blaster which spread across the Internet and infect more 
than 90% of the vulnerable systems have sparked a dramatic interest in Information Assurance 
(IA). Those events increase the number of high-profile organizational failures for inadequacy of 
data, information and intelligence available to decision making at key moments. Despite spending 
millions of dollars on firewalls, encryption technologies, and intrusion detection software, 
information infrastructure vulnerabilities and incidents continue to happen. Therefore, it is a 
necessity for organizations to provide confidence and certainty of its information and ensure 
certain levels of availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of their 
information assets against unacceptable risk. This is referred to as Information Assurance (IA) 
(Blyth and Kovacich 2001). It is assuring that the security mechanisms are actually effective and 
the system can be entrusted with the processing tasks on the critical information. This study 
presents a risk level estimation model that derives risk level as a conditional probability over 
frequency and impact estimates. The frequency and impact estimates are derived from a set of 
attributes specified in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). This model predicts 
the risk level of vulnerabilities based on service level and capability needs of this service from the 
organization to achieve the critical missions. Therefore, IA imposes on an organization a review 
of its mission and threats and the securing of its needed capabilities against the risks those threats 
pose. This study presents developed approaches depend on the Fuzzy-based techniques including 
adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy approaches. Historical data have been used from National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) to develop and test the proposed models. Different models have been developed 
such as, Sugeno Fuzzy inference System (FIS) with hybrid optimization technique, Sugeno Model 
using Subtractive clustering, Sugeno cascaded model using subtractive clustering with hybrid 
optimization technique, and finally Mamdani models. All developed models have been checked 
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for adequacy. Different measures have been adapted such as Correlation Coefficient (CC), Mean 
Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and percentage of 
differences between the actual and predicted data. The IA risk level model performance has been 
improved by grid partition with hybrid optimization technique models which the CC obtained is 
equal to 0.993 (Maximum) and corresponding MAPE, RMSE, Percentage of difference are the 
minimum values which are 0.00354, 0.0110, 0.3546 respectively. These promising findings 
suggest the adequacy and potential of these mathematical techniques to address this type of 
problem. Although, we have demonstrated the potential of the Fuzzy-based approach, but still we 
need to extend this research with more data and different other types of Risk Analysis to state and 
conclude its promising approach.  
 
Keywords: Information Assurance, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, CVSS, Sugeno, 
Hybrid Optimization, Subtractive Clustering, Cascaded Model, Cross Validation, Risk Level. 
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 ملخص الدراسة
 ٪09 من أكثر وتصيب الانترنت عبر انتشرت التي retsalBو  remmalS LQSان الأحداث الأخيرة مثل 
المعلومات. تلك الأحداث تزيد من  دراماتيكيا لتأمين اهتماما أثارت عرضة للاصابة تكون  التي الأنظمة من
المعلومات والمعلومات الاستخبارية المتوفرة  لعدم توافر البيانات،  عدد الاخفاقات لمؤسسات رفيعة المستوى 
 لاتخاذ القرارات في اللحظات الرئيسية.
 ان فير، وبرامج كشف التسلل الاوعلى الرغم من إنفاق ملايين الدولارات على جدران الحماية، وتقنيات التش
 .رات البنية التحتية للمعلومات وحوادث الاختراق مازالت تحدثغث
مؤسسات ان توفر الثقة واليقين لمعلوماتها، وضمان وجود مستويات معينة من توافرها، لذلك، من الضروري لل
توثيقها، سريتها وعدم التنصل من أصول معلوماتها ضد مخاطر غير مقبولة. هذا ما يشار اليه   سلامتها،
أن  النظام يمكن فهي تؤكد أن التقنيات الأمنية المستخدمة هي في الواقع فعالة وان.  )AI(بتأمين المعلومات
 تستمد التيو  المخاطر مستوى  لتقدير انموذج الدراسة هذه تقدم. يعهد إليها مهام المعالجة للمعلومات الهامة
من تقدير تردد حدوثه وتأثيره. وتستمد تقديرات تردد الحدوث  الشرطي الاحتمالالخطر هو  مستوى  باعتبار
. هذا النموذج يتنبأ قيمة  )SSVC(قدير الثغرات الشائعةوتاثيره من مجموعة من السمات المحددة من نظام ت
مستوى خطر الثغرات بناء على مستوى الخدمة وقدرة احتياج تلك الخدمة من المؤسسة لتحقيق مهامها الحرجة. 
لذلك فان تأمين المعلومات يفرض على المؤسسة مراجعة مهامها والتهديدات الأمنية وتأمين قدراتها اللازمة 
 )yzzuF( التقنيات الضبابيةتقدم هذه الدراسة نهج متطورة تعتمد على  ر والتي تشكل تهديدات.ضد المخاط
 .)yzzuF orueN evitpadA(الأنظمة الاستنتاجية العصبية الضبابية القابلة للتكيف   والتي تتضمن
رحة. نماذج اذج المقتأستخدمت من قاعدة بيانات الثغرات العالمية لتطوير واختبار النم وحقيقية بيانات قديمة
، )dirbyH(نة أو المركبة مختلفة تشمل "سوجينو" بواسطة تقنية التحسين الهجيبتقنيات  )oneguS("سوجينو" 
، نموذج "سوجينو" باستخدام )gniretsulC evitcartbuS(نموذج "سوجينو" باستخدام تقنية الكتل الطرحي 
موذج ن النموذج باستخدام تقنية التحسين الهجينة)، واخيرا نالطريقة المتعاقبة (تقنية التكتل الطرحي ثم تحسي
 .)inadmaM("مامداني" 
 noitalerroC( معامل التوافق كل النماذج المطورة تم فحص دقتها. مقاييس مختلفة تم ملاءمتها مثل
، )EPAM( "ق القيمة الحقيقية مع المتنبأة، متوسط نسبة القيمة المطلقة "ميبلقياس مدى تطاب  )tneiciffeoC
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قد أشارت و ، ونسبة الاختلاف بين البيانات الحقيقية والبينات المتنبأة. )ESMR(ومتوسط مربع الجذر "أرمسي" 
ين المعلومات نموذج "سوجينو" الذي بني باستخدام التحسين الهجينة أداء نموذج مستوى الخطر لتأمالنتائج أن 
وهي القيمة الأعلى بين بقية  399.0بلغت  توافقمعامل درجة ال حيث ان قيمة حصل على أفضل النتائج
، 45300.0ونسبة الاختلاف وهي القيم الاصغر بين النماذج وهي  "أرمسي"، "ميب"النماذج وبالمثل فان قيم 
 على التوالي. 6453.0، 0110.0
 الرغم اكل، وعلىالمش من النوع هذا لمعالجة الرياضية التقنيات هذه وا  مكانات كفاية المبشرة النتائج هذه وتشير
 من مزيدال مع البحث هذا لتمديد بحاجة زلنا لا لكننا ،ة على الضبابيةالقائم النهج إمكانات أظهرنا أننا من
 .المبشر واستنتاج نهجها لتوضيح المخاطر تحليل من مختلفة أخرى  وأنواع البيانات
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Chapter One : Introduction 
1.1  Preface 
 
In this digital era where the valuable information is being transferred, stored and processed 
electronically than any other forms and where the organizations recognize the information system 
importance to successfully carry out their missions, the ISO 27002 defines information as an asset, 
which, like other important business assets (Tajuddin, Olphert et al. 2015), is essential to an 
organization’s business and consequently needs to ensure the security services (confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, authentication, non-repudiation) of modern information systems and 
applications. It is found that the number of large companies that suffered a security incident during 
2008 - 2010 increased from 72% up to 92% (PWC 2014). Furthermore, the average cost of the 
worst security incident in large companies increased from 650 thousand dollars to 5.9 million 
dollars (PWC 2014). Installing firewalls, antiviruses and applying different security technologies 
and mechanisms are only addressing the protection of information and information systems against 
unauthorized activities such as disclosure, transfer, modification, or destruction. These activities 
affect the security needs of information systems and cannot deliver the level of information 
assurance that modern information systems require. Therefore, it is a necessity for organizations 
to provide confidence and certainty of its information and ensure a certain levels of availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of an organization’s information 
assets against unacceptable risk. This is referred to as information assurance (IA). It is assuring 
that the security mechanisms are actually effective and the system can be entrusted with the 
processing tasks on the critical information. IA imposes on an organization a review of its mission 
and threats and the securing of its needed capabilities against the risks those threats pose. The 
complexity of IA represents a myriad of considerations and decisions that exceed technological 
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advancement, economic, social cultural, institutional, organizational, and educational dimensions. 
This may explain the difficulties associated with IA. Appendix A summarizes some of the IA 
definitions from different perspectives. It shows that the definitions mostly share five pillars of 
security goals (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authentication and Non-Repudiation). The 
interrelation between IA and Information Security (INFOSEC) has been presented as a survey 
among the IA and INFOSEC professionals (Cherdantseva and Hilton 2013). These professionals 
were invited to describe the relationship between the two disciplines. The summary of responses 
concludes that the IA is a part of INFOSEC. Whereas, Peng and coauthors (Peng Liu, Meng Yu et 
al. 2001) presented  that the concept of IA is much broader than the INFOSEC. Whereas, the goal 
of INFOSEC technologies is to prevent attacks from happening and focus on technological tools, 
the goal of IA is to ensure that even if some attacks intrude into an Information System (IS), IS 
can still operate. Several available definitions in the literature are presented in Appendix A. In this 
research, we adopt the (Peng Liu, Meng Yu et al. 2001) definition as indicates about measures of 
an acceptable level of security services of an information to develop an approach that measures a 
quantifiable IA risks by conducting an IA vulnerability assessment which involves looking at the 
vulnerabilities in organization and understanding the mitigation of those vulnerabilities. IA is 
defined as information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentially, and non-repudiation. This 
includes the provision for the restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, 
detection and reaction capabilities (IATF 1999). The adopted IA model is as shown in Figure (1.1). 
IA model addresses five dimensions as follow: 
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1. Availability: The availability of information is a measure of how often information is 
capable of being accessed as needed. It involves information being where users need it when 
they need it. Availability is a key component to IA. 
2.  Integrity: Integrity of information is the probability that the information will be correct 
when accessed.  
3. Confidentiality: Confidentiality is a measure of how well protected information is from 
being read, transmitted, viewed, or interpreted by unauthorized persons or organizations.  
4.  Authentication: Authentication is the process of verifying the identity or other attributes 
claimed by or assumed of an entity (user, process, or device), or to verify the source and 
integrity of data. 
5.  Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is to assure that the sender of information is provided 
with proof of delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender's identity, so 
neither can later deny having processed the information. 
From the definitions of the five security goals as previously mentioned above and the IA, IA also 
assumes a security of authenticity, as it applies to confidentiality and integrity, and non-
repudiation, as it applies to integrity (Matthews 2004). 
 
Figure (1.1) The dimensions of the IA model 
Souce (Maconachy, Schou et al. 2001) 
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1.2  IA Examples 
 
The next three sections describe three IA cases and their impacts and illustrate the importance of 
risk assessment. 
1.2.1 SQL Slammer 
 
SQL slammer is the fastest self-propagation worm which spreads across the internet and infects 
more than 90 percent of the vulnerable systems within the first 10 minutes and takes many small 
networks offline with its scanning (Moore, Paxson et al. 2003). Slammer was doubling in size 
every 8.5 seconds and within 3 minutes it had scanned approximately 55 million IP addresses per 
second causing disruption of the internet This worm targets the unpatched Microsoft SQL server 
which increases traffic on the UDP port 1434 and causes heavy network traffic that can slow down 
network performance and lead to denial of service and affect the availability of the server. Another 
way that can use the SQL slammer is to exploit the buffer overflow vulnerability in the SQL server 
which affects the availability of the server by generating a random IP addresses and sending itself 
to those addresses from the infected system. In this case the attacker use the exploitability tool 
(worm) to exploit the SQL server (asset) through the vulnerability (UDP port 1434) which make a 
loss in availability and reduce the IA of the asset.  Therefore this threat will affect the mission of 
the organization. Thus, reviewing the IA vulnerabilities of the SQL server and securing it by 
applying the patch that prevent the attack to exploit the port. It will prevent the SQL slammer 
exploitation that cause denial-of-service attacks. 
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1.2.2  Blaster 
 
The blaster worm is a virus program that targets the Microsoft operating system by exploiting the 
flow in Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (RPC) process using Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP) port number 135 that shuts down the infected computers (Bailey, Cooke et al. 2005). It 
affected at least 500000 Microsoft computers around the worlds. Maryland motors vehicle 
administration shut its offices for a day. In eight days after the blaster worm propagated, the 
estimated cost of damages neared 2$ billion (Bailey, Cooke et al. 2005). Exploited this 
vulnerability will affect the critical systems used by the infected computer which affect the 
availability capability of the systems. This vulnerability will reduce the IA and affect the 
availability security service of the information. This vulnerability was exposed by the Last Stage 
of Delirium (LSD) security group and later by Microsoft which released two different patches 
(MS03-026 and MS03-039) on its website. 
1.2.3  SOBIG.F  
 
SOBIG is another worm targets the Microsoft windows computer and infected millions of internet-
connected systems.  The CNN international news posted in august 2003 that the SoBig.F computer 
virus which has already overwhelmed hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide has become 
the fastest spreading virus ever with experts warning the worst is yet to come (CNN 2003). This 
worm transmit by email and arrives with various subject headers, such as: Your details, Thank 
you!, Re: Thank you!, Re: Details, Re: Re: My details, Re: Approved, Re: Your application, Re: 
Wicked screensaver or Re: That movie. The user triggers the worm when the user open the email 
which then flood the message to all other addresses in the email address book and infected more 
computers. This worm also affect the availability security service of information by reducing the 
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performance of the network and overwhelmed the network. Therefore, this worm will reduce the 
IA of the information. 
1.3  Motivation 
 
Thesis motivation comes firstly from the necessary needs of the high-profile Palestinian 
organizations such as Hadarah Company. The information security manager in Hadarah Company 
announced to the researcher that the company are having efforts towards applying IA since four 
years. This was the motivation for research in this subject. Secondly from the background and 
experience of the researcher in information system, security, networks and developments, in 
addition to working in several organizations with different information systems which were based 
on critical and confidential information such as medical IS, accounting IS, university management 
system ...etc. In these information systems, there were no evidence of the effectiveness of the 
security features. As the importance of medical system, I chose the medical IS to mention the 
trends of hackers. Each medical IS record consists of different important fields of patients 
including names, identity number, diagnosis and medications code, billing information and 
insurance company. Therefore, the hackers discover a new way to make money by offering all 
data records of patients for sale to another (counterpart competitor medical center) or another 
insurance company. Also the fraudsters can use this data to create fake IDs to buy medical 
equipment or drugs that can be resold, or they combine a patient number with a false provider 
number and file made-up claims with insurers according to experts who have investigated 
cyber-attacks on healthcare organizations. According to an annual survey by the Ponemon 
Institute think tank on data protection policy, the percentage of healthcare organizations that 
have reported a criminal cyber-attack has risen to 40% in 2013 from 20% in 2009 (Luftman 
and Ben-Zvi 2010). 
7 
 
In addition, there was a lack of basic IA understanding in the Palestinian organizations. 
Worldwide, organizations spend thousands of dollars for a security software or consultation from 
different vendors, but these securities mostly have different vulnerabilities that make a crisis. 
Whereas, (Secunia 2014) showed the number of vulnerabilities detected was 13,073, discovered 
in 2,289 products from 539 vendors. According to (Secunia 2014), 45% of the vulnerabilities have 
increased in a five year trend, and a 32% increase from 2012 to 2013. Since 2012, the amount of 
vulnerable vendors have increased by 13% and the amount of vulnerable products has decreased 
by 6%. Also this thesis is important to promote the IA hot field and hopefully support the 
Palestinian vendors of the information systems whereas the vendor may lose around 0.6% from 
the value in stock price when a vulnerability is reported (Telang and Wattal 2005). Therefore, it is 
an imperative to research for this topic to publish and to be implemented by the large organizations 
in Palestine such as JAWWAL, PALTEL, Watania, JEDCO, Insurance Companies …etc. to 
assessment the vulnerabilities and mitigate the risk. 
1.4  Problem Statement 
 
The complexity of the information assurance arises from the large number of assets, the 
connections among each asset (software, hardware, network, database, etc.), and from the 
interconnections between assets. Thus, each asset has a number of vulnerabilities from different 
sources which affect the system behavior of asset. Figure (1.2) illustrate the internal and 
environmental influence fault in a critical system such as an application failure; operating system 
failure and hardware failure that produce a risk level and affect the system behaviors. 
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Figure (1.2) System internal and environmental fault produce a different risk level sources that 
affect the critical system behavior.  
(source:(Houmb, Nunes Leal Franqueira et al. 2008)) 
 
Organizations consider that using protection tools including firewalls, filtering routers, password 
protections, encryptions, access controls and file permissions are enough for protection. Yet a 
small vulnerability can be compromised in the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
information. For example, inserting a series of two dots “..” into a URL in a company’s web server 
application by a hacker can make the server navigate out of its document directories and retrieve 
a database of user names and encrypted passwords (Martin 2001).  
Organizations must realize what they need to be able to do with their wealth of information, and 
what risks they are willing to take in order to maintain those capabilities. Mostly, the IA is 
determined primarily by offline evaluation processes such as analyses (CERT/CC Security 
Capability Model, NSA INFOSEC Assurance Capability Model), testing (penetration testing) and 
experimentation (red team experiments). Those models are largely qualitative. 
This research will address the following issues: 
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1. How to measure an acceptable level of IA for each vulnerability? 
2. How to find the total IA risk level for each asset? 
3. What are the IA metrics applies across all systems? 
1.5  Thesis Contribution 
 
The ultimate goal of this thesis work is developing an IA vulnerability risk assessment approach 
that quantitatively evaluates the vulnerability in each asset and measures the IA level of acceptable 
risk. This major contribution will assist an organization to secure its information assets against 
unacceptable loss of availability, integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation. 
Conducting an IA vulnerability assessment involves looking at the vulnerabilities on the 
organization and understanding the mitigation of those vulnerabilities that could create 
unacceptable losses. In order to achieve the IA assessment for vulnerabilities, this thesis has 
contributed with the followings: 
1. Building an IA vulnerability assessment model that combines the impact and frequency of 
the attack for each vulnerability. Before deciding which vulnerabilities to be concerned 
with, the organization needs to understand what are the capabilities’ needs. Therefore, the 
organization understands what risks are acceptable. This thesis presents the developed 
models using NEUROFUZZY BASED MODELING TECHNIQUES. Several model have 
been developed such as: 1. Sugeno with Hybrid optimization techniques 2. Subtractive 
clustering 3. Cascaded model (clustering with hybrid optimization techniques) 4. Mamdani 
model also was developed but only for the first stage 5. Check the adequacy of the 
developed model to demonstrate their performance, four measurements have been used to 
effectively check the adequacy of results (CC, MAPE, RMSE, Percentage of differences). 
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2. The total risk for each asset can be calculated by aggregating all risks for all vulnerabilities 
by Mamdani system which takes the maximum risk value. 
3. Calculation of risk security needs.  
4. By observing the changes in the input values to figure out the effect of IA assessment. 
1.6  Research Constraints 
 
As this thesis discusses the topics in depth, it is also important to indicate the boundaries and 
limitations of this research. The restrictions are as follow: 
Firstly, the information assurance domain at the organizational level is dynamic, highly connected 
to myriad of considerations and decisions that exceed technological advancement, and surpass 
legal, political, economic, social, cultural, institutional, organizational, and educational 
dimensions. This may explain the difficulties associated with the IA. 
Secondly, the lack of information available, organizations did not accept the thesis request to 
collect some data from its Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) 
due to the data confidentiality. Therefore, we have used a specific data that is available on the 
internet from National Vulnerability Database (NVD) (NVD 2004) which includes data for some 
vendors such as Microsoft, Symantec, Cisco, etc. 
1.6  Thesis Methodology 
 
In this thesis, the proposed approach is to quantify the IA risk level by conducting the 
vulnerabilities assessment for each critical asset. The risk level will be calculated by combining 
the frequency and impact of the attacks for each vulnerability in the asset by making use of the 
subset of attributes from CVSS as shown in Figure (1.3). The CVSS attributes of each groups have 
rating terms and values (see Appendix A). This approach has been implemented using the 
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NEUROFUZZY BASED MODELING TECHNIQUES. Neurofuzzy approach combines the fuzzy 
inference system (FIS) and neural network (NN) making use of different learning procedure. 
Figure (1.4) shows the general block diagram of predicting IA risk level. The ANFIS approach was 
applied in modeling IA vulnerability assessment based on CVSS data that were derived from 
different security companies, software vendors, hardware vendors and researchers.  
 
Figure (1.3) Impact and frequency estimation using subset of attributes from the CVSS 
(source:(Houmb, Nunes Leal Franqueira et al. 2008)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (1.4) General Block Diagram for Predicting IA Risk Level  
(drawing by the author) 
Pre-Processed 
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Frequency and Impact 
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Soft Computing 
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12 
 
To achieve the contribution in this thesis, the approach can be summarized as follow: 
1. Collecting some real vulnerabilities for available common IS application that is used in an 
organization retrieved from National Vulnerability Database (NVD). 
2. Analyzing of the data and pre-processing the system input before the training stage. 
3. Studying the initial and updated factors of CVSS metrics that affect the frequency and 
impact for each vulnerability. 
4. Computing Initial Frequency: Identifying the input (Access Vector, Access Complexity, 
and Authentication) metrics from base group of CVSS v2 and the output (Exploitability). 
The three input and one output factor are used to develop a Sugeno Fuzzy Inference System 
(FIS) model using the Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) with different 
optimization techniques to predict the initial frequency risk. 
5. Computing Updated frequency: Identifying the input (Exploitability tools, Remediation 
Level, and Report Confidence) metrics from temporal group of CVSS v2 combined with 
the initial frequency and the output (Temporal Score). The four input and one output factor 
are used to develop a Sugeno Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) model using the Adaptive 
Neuro Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) with different optimization techniques to update 
the initial frequency risk. 
6. Computing Initial Impact: Identifying the input (Confidentiality Impact, Integrity Impact, 
and Availability Impact) metrics from base group of CVSS v2 and the output (impact). The 
three input and one output factor are used to develop a Sugeno Fuzzy Inference System 
(FIS) model using the Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) with different 
optimization techniques to predict the initial impact risk. 
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7. Computing Updated Impact: Identifying the input (Confidentiality Requirement, Integrity 
Requirement, Availability Requirement and collateral damage potential) metrics from 
environmental group of CVSS v2 and the output (updated impact) The four input and one 
output factor are used to develop a Sugeno Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) model using the 
Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) with different optimization techniques 
to predict the updated impact risk. 
8. The update frequency and updated impact are also combined to predict the final risk level 
for one vulnerability. 
9. All final risks of vulnerabilities that are associated with one asset are also combined as an 
input to a Mamdani fuzzy system to calculate the IA risk level. 
10. Evaluating the predicted output using the developed models and calculating several 
measures including the CC, MAPE, RMSE and Percentage of difference. 
1. A simulation tool has been developed making use of the Simulink tools in mathlab R2013a 
to compare the values at each stage. 
 
Thus, this approach includes four stages to accomplish the IA assessment for one asset, starting 
with calculating the frequency, impact, risk value for one vulnerability and ending with The total 
risk for asset is aggregated the risks of all vulnerabilities in this asset as illustrated below: 
Stage 1: computing the initial frequency and initial impact. 
Stage 2: computing the updated frequency and updated impact. 
Stage 3: calculates the risk level by combined the updated frequency and updated impact.  
Stage 4: aggregate the vulnerabilities for one asset to Mamdani fuzzy system. 
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1.7  Thesis Organization 
 
The research is mainly divided into six chapters, naming them: Literature Survey, Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), Data Profiles, Developing the Models, Results and 
Discussions and finally the Conclusions and Future Works. The search is organized as follows: 
Chapter two gives an overview of the research approaches for the risk assessments. Also this 
chapter consists of different approaches accomplished by researchers that assess the risks with 
different data used. Chapter three provides a brief overview of the standard CVSS (Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System) and its metrics. Chapter four introduces the historical data that have 
been used, and the pre-processing and manipulation of data is discussed. Chapter five, presents in 
details, the various models that have been developed and make use of the metrics of the CVSS as 
inputs. These models include Sugeno models with hybrid optimization technique, Subtractive 
Clustering, cascading two techniques and Mamdani model. In addition, the error measures that 
were used to compare between the actual and predicted data was discussed in the same chapter. 
While chapter six, presents and discusses the results of the developed models, with brief 
comparisons with related findings published by other researchers chapter seven concludes and 
highlights the research results obtained and suggests future work for this important research work. 
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Chapter Two : Literature Survey 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the research approach. This chapter is divided 
into two sections. The first sections shows related work which are general risk assessment 
approach in security and risk assessment in IA. The different approaches are listed and described 
below. There are a lot of methods and approaches make an offline assessment by analyzers 
according to guidelines. The second section is analysis of the related work.  
2.1  Related Work 
 
Chen and Tian (Chen and Tian 2015) have introduce a comprehensive introduction of condition 
of attack state and how they analysis it from massive xml file. They investigate the NIST National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD). Multi-attribute-based classification method supports mining 
privilege level of vulnerability. Owing to associated analysis, it combined directly and indirectly 
of vulnerability threats which makes evaluation more convinced. The initial approach was using 
model checking techniques A model checker could assist engineers to identify individual design 
flaws in a model of a system. Using model checkers, the researchers could get away of custom 
special purpose tools for attack graph generation. To check if the system has a bug or side effect, 
the model is completed looked after whether it meets a correctness specification. The model is a 
state staff defined by variables, initial values for the variables and a description of the 15 conditions 
under which variables may change value. When the variables change value they cause a state 
transition. The sum of all possible states of a state machine is the state space. The model can be 
automatically checked by a model checker against a correctness specification if the model has any 
flaws. The correctness specifications are expressed in propositional temporal logic. The model 
checker performs an exhaustive search through the state space to determine that each state satisfies 
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the correctness specification. If the correctness specification is not satisfied, the model checker 
will give a counterexample execution, showing the sequence of states that lead to the violation of 
the correctness specification. 
Cho (Cho 2015) has implemented a system named the website security mining system, which 
leverages a web crawling algorithm to analyze web URL and e-mail address leaks through black-
box testing of 20 well-known universities’ websites. Based on their data, academic website 
maintainers can be clearly informed about what kind of danger they are exposed to, which URLs 
are highly in danger, and the need to patch the website to protect against vulnerabilities and prevent 
academic resources from attacks. The WSMS is designed to combine search engine technology 
with vulnerability testing to automatically spider and assess the security of a target website. This 
study present the Static and Dynamic Mining. Both of the Static Mining and Dynamic Scanning 
modules can lever the system’s vulnerability inspecting function, which has two parts: known 
website vulnerability inspection and SQL injection inspection. The former compiles a database of 
open source website vulnerabilities into an XML file which is used to inspect the website to see 
whether it has the same vulnerability. 
Al-Mahrouqi and coauthors (Al-Mahrouqi, Tobin et al. 2015) simulate an SQL injection attack 
scenarios in a complex network environment. They designed and simulated a typical Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ) network environment using Graphical Network Simulator (GNS3), Virtual Box and 
VMware workstation. They collected the network logs by using Wireshark define an attack 
pathway prediction methodology that makes it possible to examine the network artifacts collected 
in case network attacks. This study use the Prediction Investigation Approach to predict and trace 
the source of the attack or illegal activities in the computer network. The idea behind this approach 
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is to identify the Evidence Collection Path (ECP) by using Evidence Collection Process Model 
(ECPM).  
Prasad (Prasad 2014) has used Genetic Algorithm to generate dynamic IP for the network to avoid 
unauthorized data transfer and prevent from attack. The Intrusion Detection System can be viewed 
as a rule-based system (RBS) and Genetic Algorithm can be viewed as a tool to help generate 
knowledge for the RBS. This project shows how network connection information can be modeled 
as chromosomes and how the parameters in genetic algorithm can be defined in this respect. He 
implemented a server side interface which is solely under the control of the administrator. Any 
transaction in the network will be monitored by the Server. It receives the packet and reads the 
header information from the packet such as the Destination address, Source address, Port no. It 
sends each and every Inflowing packets header information’s to the chromconvert module and 
then receives the converted real-time Chromosomes. The real time chromosomes are checked with 
the rule sets. If the particular chromosomes matches with the rules provided in the rule set, it takes 
the decision of whether allow or block depending on which rule set it matches. 
Lee and coauthors (Lee 2014) has reviewed various models including AHP, fuzzy, neural network, 
group decision making, software computing and hybrid model. Lee has presented the quantitative 
and qualitative models in risk assessment and has concluded that researchers prefer the AHP 
approach. Furthermore, he proposed a new method by using a hybrid models such combined 
between AHP and fuzzy system. 
In his study (Rani 2013), Rani has proposed a neuro-fuzzy approach to estimate the software risk 
in all stages of software development life cycle (SDLC). Firstly he used the fuzzy inference system 
with 17 input risk attribute. The input attributes were identified by a fuzzy terms, rules and output. 
After the Fuzzy Inference system he created then Neural Network based three different training 
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algorithms: BR (Bayesian Regulation), BP (Back Propagation) and LM (Levenberg-Marquardt) 
are used to train the neural network. He concluded that the Software Risk Estimation, BR 
(Bayesian Regulation) performs better than other algorithms. 
In their study  (Macedo and da Silva),  Macedo and da Silva aimed at comparing and clarifying  
the different activities, inputs and outputs required by each information security risk assessment 
models and also aimed at analyzing which ones address information security risk effectively. The 
identified models are the following: OCTAVE, Mehari, MAGERIT, IT-Grundschutz, EBIOS, 
IRAM, SARA, SPRINT, ISO 27005, NIST SP800-30, CRAMM, MIGRA,MAR, ISAMM, 
GAO/AIMD-00-33, IT System Security Assessment, MG-2 and MG-3, Dutch A&K Analysis, 
MARION, Austrian IT Security Handbook, Microsoft’s Security Risk Management Guide and 
Risk IT. The authors passed the selected risk assessment models into two selection iteration before 
ends up to the last stage. The first iteration is used to exclude some models based on some criteria 
(guidelines, model cannot identify the Information Security Risks, documentation is expensive or 
unavailable and if the model is discontinued, obsolete or not recently updated/reviewed). Six 
models were not excluded and compatible with all the criteria. These models are: OCTAVE, 
Mehari, MAGERIT, IT-Grundschutz, EBIOS and IRAM. Only these models will be continued to 
the second stage of selection iteration. The second selection iteration excludes the models based 
on five criteria. First criteria based on the complexity, effort and preparation this criterion tries to 
reflect the level of preparation, information, effort and skills needed to implement the model, and 
the level of detail and scope of the risk analysis results. The second criteria was based on approach 
of the model (the risk assessment approach each model advocates (e.g. self-assessment, interviews, 
workshops). Third criteria based on tools (if the model provides supporting tools and how can we 
obtain them). The fourth and fifth criteria describe the origin (academic, governmental) and 
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Geographical spread (countries in which the model is known to have been implemented). The final 
stage was compared between IT-Grundschutz, OCTAVE, IRAM under study were applied in a 
real organization. The findings of the study shows IRAM is the approach that better conciliates 
usability, complexity, flexibility and final results. OCTAVE, despite it is simple and quick, just 
produces the essential information with no great details. On the other hand, we have 
ITGrundschutz that calculates the IT security level of the organization and provides very detailed 
technical recommendations, but at a very high cost (time, expertise and resources). Most the 
models that are mentioned above were much more subjective and unquantifiable which make the 
risk assessment process complex and could not reflect the accurate risk. 
Yu and coauthors has focused, in the study of (Yu, Liang et al. 2010), on the risk profile work 
sheet of OCTAVE, which is one of the risk assessment models. They proposed a method to give 
a numerical value to each of business impact along the definite threat path and its probability. The 
proposed method was based on CVSS which is one of the scoring methods to possible 
vulnerabilities in information network system. CVSS itself was discussed in this chapter as one of 
the approaches. This method used the CVSS indices and calculation formulas to give the impact 
and probability values on OCTAVE’s threat work sheet by giving correspondence between each 
of their indices. This method matches between the CVSS metrics and the linguistic values for items 
on the threat path. Such as for “Access” in OCTAVE correspondence with “AV” value in CVSS 
because the OCTAVE does not have “adjacent network”. Whereas the “Actor” correspondence 
with “AC, AU” and “Motive” correspondence with “L”, “ML”, “MC” and “Outcome” 
correspondence with “C”, “I”, “A”. After determining the threat path, then go to scoring impact 
values for each of impact categories. This proposed to correspond each of them to a vector of 
values (“CDP”, “CR”, “IR”, “AR”). In the next step, the preliminary scores are adjusted by values 
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of “Exploitability” and “Management Level”. Finally, the collateral damage potential (CDP) value 
is integrated to obtain the impact value for each of impact category which include “Reputation”, 
“Financial”, “Productive”, “Fines”, “Safety”, “Others”. 
 
Gallegos and Smith in their study (Gallegos and Smith 2006) proposed red team tactics which is 
composed of individuals skilled in performing ethical hacking—employing the same tactics 
malicious hackers may use against information systems, but instead of damaging systems or 
stealing information, the findings are reported back to the organization. The auditors of the IS can 
use this tactics in the organizations to assess the risk, but this tactics do not gain a wider acceptance 
in the organization. This is firstly because the auditors must increase their awareness of tactics 
used by hackers by training and collaborating with information security professionals. Secondly, 
the concept of “ethical hacking” is still a hard sell for organizations that might be wary of allowing 
someone to subvert their security without employees being given advance notice. 
Houmb and coauthors presented a model in (Houmb, Nunes Leal Franqueira et al. 2008)  that 
estimates risk level of known vulnerabilities as a combination of frequency and impact estimates 
derived from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The model used the base and 
temporal metrics to estimate frequency and the base and environmental to estimate impact. The 
model was implemented as a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). BBN is a directed acyclic graph 
(DAG) together with an associated set of probability tables. A DAG consists of nodes representing 
the variables involved and arcs representing the dependencies between these variables. Nodes were 
defined as stochastic or decision variables and multiple variables may be used to determine the 
state of a node. There were three types of nodes in a DAG: target node(s) which the objective of 
the network, intermediate nodes and observable nodes. Each state of a node was expressed using 
probability density functions. Probability density expresses the confidence in the various outcomes 
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of the set of variables connected to a node and depends conditionally on the status of the parent 
nodes at the incoming edges. The directed arcs between the nodes denote the causal relationship 
between the underlying variables. Evidence or information was entered at the observable nodes 
and propagated through the network using the causal relationships and a propagation algorithm 
based on the underlying computational model of BBN. 
 
Dondo has presented in his study (Dondo 2008) a fuzzy system approach for assessing the 
individual asset by calculating the potential risk exposure for the vulnerabilities associated with 
these assets. Then the analyzer can rank the vulnerabilities associated with the asset. This model 
was based on CVSS attributes which defined the CVSS attributes as a Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). 
The proposed method models the KRIs as a fuzzy variables based on a combination of experience, 
expertise, or historical input and defined the MF for each variable. Then combine all the identified 
KRIs into FIS to come up with a final risk value. The FIS determine the fuzzy risk value 
represented by its CIA components. The combination between the impact and likelihood of the 
attack will produce the final risk value. Finally, defuzzify the result back into a crisp value and 
compare the results for each vulnerability in order to rank them. 
 
Houmb and Franqueira have presented in their study (Houmb and Franqueira 2009) a Target of 
Evaluation (ToE)  risk level estimation model that uses CVSS to estimate misuse frequency (MF) 
and misuse impact (MI), and from these derive the risk level of ToE. This is a general risk in which 
this model works on the level of vulnerabilities and is able to compose the vulnerabilities into 
service levels. The service levels define the potential risk levels and are modelled as a Markov 
process, which are then used to predict the risk level at a particular time. MF is estimated from 
attributes in the base and temporal metrics of CVSS and MI is estimated from attributes in the base 
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and environmental metrics of CVSS. The base metrics of CVSS is used to establish the initial 
estimates of both MF and MI. MF is then made attack specific by adding in factors concerning the 
attack tools available, the existing security measures and the report confidence. For MI, the initial 
MI of a potential vulnerability exploit (attack) derived from the base metrics is made ToE specific 
by taking the relevant security requirements into consideration. An important factor to note for MI 
is that there are no impacts of a potential vulnerability exploit (attack) if there are no relevant 
requirements.  
 
Mell and coauothers have presented in their study (Mell, Scarfone et al. 2006; Mell, Scarfone et 
al. 2007) a CVSS which is an open framework that prioritize the vulnerabilities and remediate 
those that pose the greatest risk. This system assesses the vulnerabilities acrosss many disparate 
hardware and software platform. CVSS is composed of three metric groups: Base, Temporal, and 
Environmental, each consisting of a set of metrics. The base metric is used to represent the intrinsic 
and fundamental characteristics of a vulnerability that are constant over time and user 
environments, whereas the temporal metrics represents the characteristics of a vulnerability that 
change over time but not among user environments and the Environmental metrics represents the 
characteristics of a vulnerability that are relevant and unique to a particular user’s environment. 
The main aim of this approach is to defined the fundemental characterstics of the vulnerabilities 
and then the user can invoke the temporal and environmental metrics to provide more accuratly 
risk to their crtical asset. There are a number of other vulnerability “scoring” systems managed by 
both commercial and noncommercial organizations.  
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1. Security Bulletin Severity Rating System: which is intended to help the customers of 
Microsoft to decide which updates they should apply under their particular circumstances, 
and how rapidly they need to take action (Microsoft). 
2. The SANS vulnerability analysis scale considers whether the weakness is found in default 
configurations or client or server systems. 
3. CERT/CC produces a numeric score ranging from 0 to 180 but considers such factors as 
whether the Internet infrastructure is at risk and what sort of preconditions are required to 
exploit the vulnerability. 
4. A New CVSS-Based Tool to Mitigate the Effects of Software Vulnerabilities (Ali, 
Zavarsky et al. 2011) . 
 
In their study (Okereke and Osuagwu 2012), Okereke and Osuagwu have examined security 
metrics available to information systems and have proposed a metric model for web page 
vulnerability measurement and ranking. This proposed a model called web application security 
evaluator (WASE) which used a WASE software which crawls through the sites to extract the 
security vulnerability parameters and assign a specific value to each parameter. 
 
Adebiyi and coauthors have proposed in their study (Adebiyi, Arreymbi et al. 2013) a new 
approach for assessing security during the design phase than implementation or testing phase by 
three-layered feed-forward back-propagation of neural network (NN). This method used the neural 
network approach in analyzing software design for security flaws which is based on the abstract 
and match technique through which software flaws in a software design can be identified when an 
attack pattern is matched to the design. This method collecting data from online vulnerability 
databases and identified the attack attributes which were used to abstract the data capturing the 
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attack scenario for training the neural network. The attack attributes identified in the paper which 
include 12 inputs. The data collected are converted in ASCII comma delimited format and then 
used in training the neural network. For the expected output from the neural network, the data used 
in training network is derived from the attack pattern which has been identified in each of the 
attack scenarios. 
 
Shameli and Shajari have presented in their study (Shameli-Sendi, Shajari et al. 2012) a practical 
model for information security risk assessment. This model is based on multi-criteria decision-
making and uses fuzzy logic. The proposed risk assessment is a qualitative approach according to 
ISO/IEC 27005 standard. In the proposed model, a fuzzy technique was used to connect expert 
opinion with linguistic variables. These linguistic variables reflect the expert opinions. In this 
model determined the likelihood and impact of each threat, effective criterions for their 
measurement have been considered. 
Finally, Sendi and coauthers have presented in their study (Sendi, Jabbarifar et al. 2010) the 
FEMRA model which uses the fuzzy expert systems to assess the risk in organizations. The risk 
assessment varies considerably with the context, the metrics used as dependent variables, and the 
opinions of the persons involved. This model represents each risk with numerical values. The 
authors presented three steps to achieve the goal. The first step to identify the assets which uses a 
security cube to identify and classify the assets. Then list all potential threats applicable to these 
assets. The second step is to generate a list of asset vulnerabilities and risks. The final step is to 
calculate the effect risks which sing the fuzzy models. In this model the values for each asset is 
taken from three experts in terms of CIA triad and then calculate the average.  
The above mentioned related work is summarized in Table (2.1).  
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Table (2.1) Summary of related works 
Reference Methodology Quantifiable CVSS Result 
Cho 2015 Data Mining No No used to inspect the website to see whether it has 
the same vulnerability 
Al-Mahrouqi, Tobin et 
al. 2015 
ECP No No Use Prediction Investigation Approach to 
predict and trace the source of the attack or 
illegal activities in the computer network 
Prasad 2014 Genetic 
Algorithm 
No No The real time chromosomes are checked with 
the rule sets. If the particular chromosomes 
matches with the rules provided in the rule set, 
it takes the decision of whether allow or block 
depending on which rule set it matches. 
Lee 2014 AHP Yes No Represent a quantitative and qualitative risk 
assessment by using different methods and 
recommended using a hybrid method. 
Macedo and da Silva Guidelines No No After comparing between different security 
guidelines, ITGrundschutz guideline can 
calculate the IT security level of the 
organization and provides very detailed 
technical recommendations, but at a very high 
cost (time, expertise and resources). 
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Reference Methodology Quantifiable CVSS Result 
Cho 2015 Data Mining No No used to inspect the website to see whether it has 
the same vulnerability 
Al-Mahrouqi, Tobin et 
al. 2015 
ECP No No Use Prediction Investigation Approach to 
predict and trace the source of the attack or 
illegal activities in the computer network 
Prasad 2014 Genetic 
Algorithm 
No No The real time chromosomes are checked with 
the rule sets. If the particular chromosomes 
matches with the rules provided in the rule set, 
it takes the decision of whether allow or block 
depending on which rule set it matches. 
Yu, Liang et al. 2010 Threat path on 
profile sheet of 
OCTAVE 
Yes CVSS 
formulae 
Preliminary risk impact score on work 
categorization (Reputation, Financial, 
Productive, Fines, and Safety) by using CVSS 
indices and equations. 
Gallegos and Smith 
2006 
Ethical hacking No No Performing ethical hacking—employing the 
same tactics malicious hackers may use against 
information systems, but instead of damaging 
systems or stealing information, the findings are 
reported back to the organization. 
Houmb, Nunes Leal 
Franqueira et al. 2008 
BBN Yes Yes Estimating risk level of known vulnerability by 
combining the impact and frequency of risks by 
using the CVSS metrics. 
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Reference Methodology Quantifiable CVSS Result 
Cho 2015 Data Mining No No used to inspect the website to see whether it has 
the same vulnerability 
Al-Mahrouqi, Tobin et 
al. 2015 
ECP No No Use Prediction Investigation Approach to 
predict and trace the source of the attack or 
illegal activities in the computer network 
Prasad 2014 Genetic 
Algorithm 
No No The real time chromosomes are checked with 
the rule sets. If the particular chromosomes 
matches with the rules provided in the rule set, 
it takes the decision of whether allow or block 
depending on which rule set it matches. 
Dondo 2008 Fuzzy Yes Yes Calculating risk level of vulnerability by 
combining the CVSS metrics as a KRI’s as input 
variable to a fuzzy system. 
Houmb and Franqueira 
2009 
Markov process Yes Yes Calculating the impact and frequency of 
vulnerabilities to produce the risk based on 
service level. 
Adebiyi, Arreymbi et al. 
2013 
NN No Yes This paper produce an attack pattern that used to 
check the software design flaws.  
Shameli-Sendi, Shajari 
et al. 2012 
Fuzzy Yes No Risk level of the threats that associate with 
vulnerability by an expert decisions. 
Sendi, Jabbarifar et al. 
2010 
Fuzzy Yes No Risk level of the threats that associate with 
vulnerability by an expert decisions. 
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Reference Methodology Quantifiable CVSS Result 
Cho 2015 Data Mining No No used to inspect the website to see whether it has 
the same vulnerability 
Al-Mahrouqi, Tobin et 
al. 2015 
ECP No No Use Prediction Investigation Approach to 
predict and trace the source of the attack or 
illegal activities in the computer network 
Prasad 2014 Genetic 
Algorithm 
No No The real time chromosomes are checked with 
the rule sets. If the particular chromosomes 
matches with the rules provided in the rule set, 
it takes the decision of whether allow or block 
depending on which rule set it matches. 
Rani 2013 Neuro-Fuzzy Yes No Estimate the software risk in all stages of 
software development life cycle (SDLC). 
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2.2  Related Work Analysis  
Standards and guidelines provide tools for evaluating the security controls of systems. Examples 
of this tools were shown in (Macedo and da Silva) but most evaluations were qualitative and 
subjective activity biased by the evaluator (even though they follow a standard) and the other 
quantitative evaluations have provided very detailed technical recommendations and very high 
cost (time, expertise and resources) such as ITGrundschutz.  (Shameli-Sendi, Shajari et al. 2012) 
and (Sendi, Jabbarifar et al. 2010) presented a Fuzzy system to calculate the risk based on experts 
opinion but the lack of quantitative data and the rapidly changing security environment makes it 
hard to derive accurate measures over such a long time-period and the risk value is expert specific. 
Yu, Liang et al. (2010) discussed an approach to measure security investment benefits for off the 
shelf software systems using CVSS. The authors proposed a threat path using OCTAVE profile 
sheet that focused on impact values such as productivity, reputation and privacy of the systems 
where the vulnerabilities are located. Our opinion is that, it is not easy to calculate the impact on 
productivity, reputation and privacy. Also it is better to use the environmental metrics as given in 
the CVSS, as it is easier to evaluate confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
In Dondo (2008), an approach to vulnerability prioritization using fuzzy risk analysis was 
presented. Here, the construct asset value (AV) was used to derive the risk level or risks to a 
system. The asset value (AV) is assumed given. The approach derives risk level based on the CVSS 
base metrics variables, a measure of time from when the vulnerability was reported and the 
safeguards already in the system. The author applied fuzzy rules to compute impact (I) and 
likelihood (L) and derive risk level as: AV x I x L. This approach is similar to our model, but our 
model does not use fuzzy rules. Our model uses the temporal and environmental metric groups 
given in the CVSS to estimate the risk level rather than asset value and safeguard. Asset value is 
not always easy to evaluate and might be stakeholder specific. AV is not a generalizable variable, 
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but rather context and stakeholder specific. Our models is based on CVSS, which is an open 
standard that also reveals the details behind the scores provided. Furthermore, CVSS is regularly 
updated and several information sources is taken into consideration when calculating the CVSS 
score. 
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Chapter Three : Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) V2 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a vulnerability scoring system which was 
created by NIAC (National Infrastructure Advisory Council) in 2004 and currently is maintained 
by the Forum of Incident Response and Scurity Teams (FIRST). This system is an effort of many 
companies involved including several vendors, vulnerability tools and bulletins such as hardware 
and software development companies like IBM, HP, Cisco Systems, Symantec, Microsoft, Internet 
Security Systems, vulnerability tools like Qualys and Nessus. CVSS provides a standard for 
communicating the characteristics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities. The CVSS score has a 
numeric value ranges from 0 to 10. The overall result of CVSS score resulted from three groups: 
Base, Temporal and Environmental group. Each group consists of metrics that are represented in 
terms of textual representation that reflect the values used to derive the score for each group. CVSS 
has more than one version, CVSS v1 and CVSS v2. This thesis adopt the CVSS version 2 (the 
latest version). Figure (3.1) shows the groups of CVSS v2 and metrics in each group (Mell, 
Scarfone et al. 2006). 
 
Figure (3.1) CVSS metric groups  
(source (Mell, Scarfone et al.)) 
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To validate scoring the CVSS vulnerability, the metric values of base group must be assigned. 
Thus, the base group is mandatory and must start with it to calculate the CVSS score whereas the 
two other groups (Temporal and environmental) are optional. If the temporal and environmental 
metrics are not assigned, the overall score is equal to the base score. Whereas, if the temporal 
metrics are assigned the base score will be combined with the temporal metrics to produce the 
temporal score which is equal to the overall CVSS score.  Similarly, if an environmental score is 
needed, the environmental metrics are combined with the temporal score to produce the 
environmental score ranging from 0 to 10 which is equal to the overall CVSS score. Figure (3.2) 
describes the calculation of CVSS score by the three group metrics. 
 
Figure (3.2) CVSS calculation process  
(source (Mell, Scarfone et al.)) 
 
This chapter describes the groups and metric terms in details. Let’s start with the three groups: 
Base, Temporal and Environmental group. 
3.2 Base Group 
 
The base group consists of the base metrics which reflects the characteristics of the vulnerability 
to produce the base score. The base score is combined from two sub score, exploitability sub scores 
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and impact sub score. The exploitability sub score is composed of the Access Vector (B_AV), 
Access Complexity (B_AC), and Authentication (B_AU) metrics. Those metrics of exploitability 
sub score measure how the vulnerability is accessed and whether or not extra conditions are 
required to exploit it. The second sub score of base score is the impact sub score which measure 
how a vulnerability, if exploited, will directly affect an IT asset, where the impacts are 
independently defined as the degree of loss of confidentiality (B_C), integrity (B_I), and 
availability (B_A). The next section describes the metrics of base group in more details. 
3.2.1 Access Vector 
 
The access vector metric measure how the vulnerability is exploited. This metrics have possible 
values which represented in string terms ranging from local, adjacent network and network (or 
remote). Table (3.1) lists the access vector metric values. 
Table (3.1) Access Vector Scoring 
Value Description Score 
Local (L) The attacker must either have physical access to the vulnerable system 
(e.g. firewire attacks) or a local account (e.g. a privilege escalation attack). 
0.395 
Adjacent 
Network (A) 
The attacker must have access to the broadcast or collision domain of the 
vulnerable system (e.g. ARP spoofing, Bluetooth attacks). 
0.646 
Network (N) The vulnerable interface is working at layer 3 or above of the OSI Network 
stack. These types of vulnerabilities are often described as remotely 
exploitable (e.g. a remote buffer overflow in a network service) 
1.0 
 
The metric values in Table (3.1) represented as linguistic terms and numeric values  
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3.2.2 Access Complexity 
 
This metric measures the complexity of the attacks required to exploit the vulnerability of the 
system. Some attackers can exploit the system when gained some privilege such as buffer overflow 
and does not need additional step. Whereas, other attacks need additional step to exploit such as 
exploit the email which require the user to download and open a tainted attachment the possible 
values for this metrics are listed in Table (3.2). 
Table (3.2) Access Complexity Scoring 
Value Description Score 
High (H) Specialised conditions exist, such as a race condition with a narrow 
window, or a requirement for social engineering methods that would be 
readily noticed by knowledgeable people. 
0.35 
Medium (M) There are some additional requirements for access, such as a limit on the 
origin of the attacks, or a requirement for the vulnerable system to be 
running with an uncommon, non-default configuration. 
0.61 
Low (L) There are no special conditions for access to the vulnerability, such as 
when the system is available to large numbers of users, or the vulnerable 
configuration is ubiquitous. 
0.71 
3.2.3 Authentication 
 
This metric measures the number of times an attacker must authenticate to a target in order to 
exploit a vulnerability. This metric measure how many times the attacker authenticate before 
exploit the system and measure the gauge of authentication or complexity of authentication. The 
metric values of authentication listed in Table (3.3). 
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Table (3.3) Authentication Scoring 
Value Description Score 
Multiple (M) Exploitation of the vulnerability requires that the attacker authenticate two 
or more times, even if the same credentials are used each time. 
0.45 
Single (S) The attacker must authenticate once in order to exploit the vulnerability. 0.56 
None (N) There is no requirement for the attacker to authenticate. 0.704 
 
The combination of three above mentioned metrics in section (3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) will produce 
the exploitability score that range from 0 to 10. Now in the next three section will discover the 
three impact metrics which produce the impact score. 
3.2.4 Confidentiality Impact 
  
Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users. The 
confidentiality impact measures the impact on confidentiality of a successfully exploited 
vulnerability. The possible values for this metric listed in Table (3.4). 
Table (3.4) Confidentiality Impact Scoring 
Value Description Score 
None (N) There is no impact on the confidentiality of the system. 0.0 
Partial (P) There is considerable disclosure of information, but the scope of the loss 
is constrained such that not all of the data is available. 
0.275 
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Value Description Score 
Complete (C) There is total information disclosure, providing access to any / all data on 
the system. 
0.660 
3.2.5 Integrity Impact 
 
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity 
refers to the trustworthiness and guaranteed veracity of information. The possible values for this 
metric are listed in Table (3.5). Increased integrity impact increases the vulnerability score. 
Table (3.5) Integrity Impact Scoring 
Value Description Score 
None (N) There is no impact on the integrity of the system. 0.0 
Partial (P) Modification of some data or system files is possible, but the scope of 
the modification is limited. 
0.275 
Complete (C) There is total loss of integrity; the attacker can modify any files or 
information on the target system. 
0.660 
2.2.6  Availability Impact 
 
This metric measures the impact to availability of a successfully exploited vulnerability. 
Availability refers to the accessibility of information resources. Attacks that consume network 
bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system. The possible 
values for this metric are listed in  
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Table (3.6). Increased availability impact increases the vulnerability score. 
 
Table (3.6) Availability Impact Scoring 
Value Description Score 
None (N) There is no impact on the availability of the system. 0.0 
Partial (P) There is reduced performance or loss of some functionality. 0.275 
Complete (C) There is total loss of availability of the attacked resource. 0.660 
3.3  Temporal Metrics 
 
The threat posed by a vulnerability may change over time. Three such factors that CVSS captures 
are: confirmation of the technical details of a vulnerability, the remediation status of the 
vulnerability, and the availability of exploit code or techniques. Since temporal metrics are 
optional they each include a metric value that has no effect on the score (Not defined). 
3.3.1 Exploitability 
 
This metric measures the current state of exploit techniques or code availability. Whereas the 
Public availability of exploit code will increases the number of potential attackers and can be easy-
to-use those who are unskilled. Increasing the exploitability code will increase the severity of the 
attack. The possible value of the exploit tools or codes ranges from easy to use and availability by 
unskilled, can be executed by a skilled hackers or this vulnerability can be exploited theoretically.  
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The possible value listed in Table (3.7). The more easily a vulnerability can be exploited, the higher 
the vulnerability score. 
 
Table (3.7) Exploitability Scoring Evaluation 
Value Description Score 
Unproven (U) No exploit code is available, or the exploit is theoretical 0.85 
Proof-of-
concept (P) 
Proof-of-concept exploit code or demonstration attacks are available, but 
not practical for widespread use. Not functional against all instances of 
the vulnerability. 
0.9 
Functional (F) Functional exploit code is available, and works in most situations where 
the vulnerability is present. 
0.95 
High (H) The vulnerability can be exploited by automated code, including mobile 
code (such as a worm or virus). 
1.0 
Not Defined 
(ND) 
This is a signal to ignore this score. 1.0 
3.3.2 Remediation Level 
 
The remediation level of a vulnerability is an important factor for prioritization. The typical 
vulnerability is unpatched when initially published. Workarounds or hotfixes may offer interim 
remediation until an official patch or upgrade is issued. Each of these respective stages adjusts 
the temporal score downwards, reflecting the decreasing urgency as remediation becomes final. 
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The possible values for this metric are listed in Table (3.8). The less official and permanent a fix, 
the higher the vulnerability score is. 
Table (3.8) Remediation Level Scoring Evaluation 
Value Description Score 
Official Fix (O) A complete vendor solution is available - either a patch or an upgrade. 0.87 
Temporary Fix 
(T) 
There is an official but temporary fix / mitigation available from the 
vendor. 
0.90 
Workaround 
(W) 
There is an unofficial, non-vendor solution or mitigation available - 
perhaps developed or suggested by users of the affected product or 
another third party. 
0.95 
Unavailable 
(U) 
There is no solution available, or it is impossible to apply a suggested 
solution. This is the usual initial state of the remediation level when a 
vulnerability is identified. 
1.0 
Not Defined 
(ND) 
This is a signal to ignore this score. 1.0 
 
3.3.3 Report Confidence 
 
This metric measures the degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the 
credibility of the known technical details. Sometimes, only the existence of vulnerabilities are 
publicized, but without specific details. The vulnerability may later be corroborated and then 
confirmed through acknowledgement by the author or vendor of the affected technology. The 
urgency of a vulnerability is higher when a vulnerability is known to exist with certainty. This 
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metric also suggests the level of technical knowledge available to would-be attackers. The possible 
values for this metric are listed in Table (3.9). The more a vulnerability is validated by the vendor 
or other reputable sources, the higher the score. 
Table (3.9) Report Confidence Scoring Evaluation 
Value Description Score 
Unconfirmed (UC) A single unconfirmed source, or multiple conflicting sources. 
Rumored vulnerability. 
0.9 
Uncorroborated 
(UR) 
Multiple sources that broadly agree - there may be a level of 
remaining uncertainty about the vulnerability 
0.95 
Confirmed (C) Acknowledged and confirmed by the vendor or manufacturer of the 
affected product. 
1.0 
Not Defined (ND) This is a signal to ignore this score. 1.0 
  
3.4 Environmental Metrics 
The CVSS environmental metric group captures the characteristics of a vulnerability that are 
associated with a user's IT environment. Since environmental metrics are optional they each 
include a metric value that has no effect on the score. This value is used when the user feels the 
particular metric does not apply and wishes to "skip over" it. 
3.4.1 Collateral Damage Potential 
 
This metric measures the potential for loss of life or physical assets through damage or theft of 
property or equipment.  The metric may also measure economic loss of productivity or revenue. 
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The possible values for this metric are listed in Table (3.10). Naturally, the greater the damage 
potential, the higher the vulnerability score. 
Table (3.10) Collateral Damage Potential Scoring Evaluation 
Value Description Score 
None (N) No potential for loss of property, revenue or productivity 0 
Low (L) Slight damage to assets, or minor loss of revenue or productivity 0.1 
Low-Medium (LM) Moderate damage or loss 0.3 
Medium-High (MH) Significant damage or loss 0.4 
High (H) Catastrophic damage or loss 0.5 
Not Defined (ND) This is a signal to ignore this score. 0 
 
Clearly, each organization must determine for themselves the precise meaning of "slight, 
moderate, significant, and catastrophic." 
3.4.2 Target Distribution 
 
This metric measures the proportion of vulnerable systems. It is meant as an environment-specific 
indicator in order to approximate the percentage of systems that could be affected by the 
vulnerability. The possible values for this metric are listed in  
Table (3.11). The greater the proportion of vulnerable systems, the higher the score. 
 
42 
 
Table (3.11) Target Distribution Scoring Evaluation 
Value Description Score 
None (N) No target systems exist, or they only exist in laboratory settings 0 
Low (L) 1%-25% of systems at risk 0.25 
Medium (M) 26%-75% of systems at risk 0.75 
High (H) 76%-100% of systems at risk 1.0 
Not Defined (ND) This is a signal to ignore this score. 1.0 
 
3.4.3 Security Requirements 
 
These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the 
affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, That is, if an IT asset supports a business function for which availability is most 
important, the analyst can assign a greater value to availability, relative to confidentiality and 
integrity. Each security requirement has three possible values: low, medium, or high. 
The possible values for the security requirements are listed in Table (3.12). For brevity, the same 
table is used for all three metrics. The greater the security requirement, the higher the score  
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Table (3.12) Security Requirements Scoring Evaluation 
Value Description Score 
Low (L) Loss of (confidentiality / integrity / availability) is likely to have only a 
limited effect on the organization. 
0.5 
Medium (M) Loss of (confidentiality / integrity / availability) is likely to have a serious 
effect on the organization. 
1.0 
High (H) Loss of (confidentiality / integrity / availability) is likely to have a 
catastrophic effect on the organization. 
1.51 
Not Defined 
(ND) 
This is a signal to ignore this score. 1.0 
 
Next chapter will introduce the thesis approach that uses the CVSS metrics with some 
rearrangement to be used as IA metrics. 
3.5 Summary 
 
CVSS is an open standard for communicating the characteristics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities. 
The CVSS score has a numeric value ranges from 0 to 10. The overall result of CVSS score 
resulted from three groups: Base, Temporal and Environmental group. Each group consists of 
metrics that are represented in terms of textual representation that reflect the values used to derive 
the score for each group. It is platform and technology independent; in practice. There are a lot of 
vulnerabilities affecting a very wide range of software products: operating systems, web and 
legacy applications, security products (firewalls, antivirus software, etc.), databases, etc. 
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An overall CVSS Score is actually composed of three sub-scores (the "Metric Groups"): the Base 
Score, the Temporal Score, and the Environmental Score. 
 The Base Score reflects "the intrinsic and fundamental characteristics of a vulnerability that are 
constant over time and user environments." 
The Temporal Score reflects "the characteristics of a vulnerability that change over time but not 
among user environments." 
The Environmental Score reflects "the characteristics of a vulnerability that are relevant and unique 
to a particular user's environment." 
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Chapter Four : Data Profiles 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter one, the major contribution is to develop a reliable IA risk level using a 
neurofuzzy based modeling techniques. Therefore, developing any supervised-based soft 
computing model needs pairs of data (inputs and outputs), and in order to have a reliable model, 
we need reasonable actual sets of data composed of vulnerabilities as an output for a specific 
systems. In this thesis we collect the vulnerabilities related to webmail system and its services 
(Perl , Apatche) and Internet Explorer (IE). The selected variables are the same as we used the 
CVSS metrics. . This chapter illustrates the data profile and preprocessing which is summarized 
in Figure (4.1) and described in detailed, in this chapter. 
Collecting Data for critical 
system
Input Variables Selection
Data formatting for real 
numbers  
Cross Validation
Training and testing 
Datasets
 
Figure (4.1) Data Preprocessing Procedure Stages 
 
 
 
46 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
The first step for assessment of the IA risk level for a critical IS (system failure can have severe 
human or economic consequence) (Rushby 1994) is to collect data about all vulnerabilities 
associated with it. NVD is a huge database of vulnerabilities for most vendors, software, 
applications and services. It is an aggregation from different databases. Table (4.1) illustrates and 
summarizes the NVD databases contents. Therefore, this thesis adopt the NVD database as the 
source of the vulnerability dataset for critical IS. For the complexity of obtainment the database of 
critical systems, therefore this thesis assumes an email asset and make an assessment for all 
vulnerabilities of this asset after collecting data. This asset is a client-server program and consist 
of different service which all of them can affect the capability of asset and impact the assurance of 
the organization as shown in Figure (4.2). 
 
Send Email
Email Server
Person in Organization
Receive Email
OpenWebmail 2.4 200409
Webserver apache httpd-2.0.51-2.9
Perl 5.1
Internet Explorer 10
 
Figure (4.2) Openwebmail Email Asset 
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Table (4.1) Summery of the NVD Database Contents (NVD 2004) 
Database Full name 
No. 
records 
Notes 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 69164 
Maintained by MITRE corporation which founds the 
vulnerability in services such as (cross site scripting, buffer 
overflow, denial of services) in software products such as 
internet browsers product (IE, chrome, Mozilla), multimedia 
software (Quick time), emails software (openWebmail) 
NCP National Checklist Program 285 
Defined by the NIST SP 800-70 Rev. 2 that provide detailed 
low level guidance on setting the security configuration of 
operating systems and applications 
US-CERT Alert 
United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team Alert 
249 
Alerts provide timely information about current security 
issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits 
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Database Full name 
No. 
records 
Notes 
US-CERT 
Vulnerability 
Notes 
Vulnerability Notes Database 4335 
The Vulnerability Notes Database provides timely 
information about software vulnerabilities. Vulnerability notes 
include summaries, technical details, remediation information, 
and lists of affected vendors. 
OVAL Queries 
Open  Vulnerability and Assessment 
Language 
10286 
Determining vulnerability and configurations issues in 
computer system 
CPE Names Common Platform Enumeration 102000 
describing and identifying classes of applications, operating 
systems, and hardware devices present among an enterprise's 
computing assets 
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Figure (4.3) shows a sample the vulnerability attributes. To assess the vulnerability of the email 
asset, we need to collect the vulnerabilities for all its services. Therefore, we need to collect the 
vulnerability for the client side (IE) and the server side (Openwebmail, Apache, Perl). Table (4.2) 
illustrates the number of vulnerabilities for each service and the total vulnerabilities for email asset 
is 1129 vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure (4.3) Some Vulnerabilities for Email Asset 
 
Table (4.2) Vulnerabilities for All Services of Email Asset 
Type Service 
Number of 
Vulnerability 
Client side IE 505 
Server Side 
OpenWebmail 13 
Apache 587 
Perl 24 
Total 1129 
4.3 Variable Selection 
As mentioned earlier in chapter one in methodology section, the risk assessment is predicted from 
frequency and impact of vulnerability exploited by attacks as briefly shown in Figure (1.3). In this 
section, we will describe in more details the input-output variables for each stage. In the first stage, 
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the initial frequency are predicted from the attributes of base group of CVSS (AV, AC, AU) and 
the initial impact from base group (C, I, A). The output from the first stage will combined with 
inputs of the second stage as shown in Figure (4.4). Changing factors will update the initial values 
in the second stage. If there is no change the initial values will goes to the third stage. 
Access Vector 
(AV)
Access 
Complexity 
(AC)
Authentication 
(AU)
Initial 
Frequency
Confidentiality 
Impact (C)
Integrity 
Impact (I)
Availability 
Impact (A)
Initial Impact
Exploitability 
Tools (E)
Remediation 
Level (RL)
Report 
Confidence 
(RC)
Updated 
Frequency
Integrity 
Requirement 
(IR)
Availability 
Requirement 
(AR)
Collateral 
Damage 
Potential (CDP)
Updated 
Impact
Confidentiality 
Requirement 
(CR)
Vulnerability Risk
V1
Base
Tem
pora
l
Base
Envir
onm
ental
V1
First Stage
Second Stage
Third Stage
 
Figure (4.4) Input-Output Variables for each Stage 
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In Figure (4.4) shows the risk level for one vulnerability. Therefore to predict the total vulnerability 
risk for one service, all predicted risk are aggregated to predict the total risk for one service as 
shown in Figure (4.5). In final stage, will aggregated all totals vulnerability for each service to 
produce the IA risk assessment for an asset. In our case, the (Email asset), will combine the total 
risk of IE, openwebmail, apache and perl as shown in Figure (4.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (4.5) Aggregated Vulnerability Risk for One Service 
Risk V1 
Risk V2 
Risk V3 
Risk Vn 
Total Risk 
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Figure (4.6) IA Risk Level Assessment for Email Asset 
4.4 Data Formatting 
To build the models, the inputs and outputs for the model should be in real numbers format. The 
data were collected for vulnerabilities, it was in linguistic terms and will be converted into real 
numbers.  Figure (4.7) and Figure (4.8) illustrate the numeric values for data formatting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (4.8) Impact Estimation Rate and 
Numeric Values 
 
 
 
Figure (4.7) Frequency Estimation Rate and 
Numeric Values 
 
 
Total Vulnerability 
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Total Vulnerability 
of Openwebmail 
Total Vulnerability 
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Total Vulnerability 
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4.5 Cross Validation 
The basic idea of using a cross validation algorithm is to avoid the over fitting problem (Error on 
the dataset used to fit the model can be misleading and perform poorly in predicting out-of-sample 
cases) (Hawkins 2004) and to construct from the available dataset two datasets, training (Tr) and 
testing (Ts) datasets. The cross validation algorithm that was used by initiating two matrices, the 
first one is used to store the training datasets and the second one is to store the testing datasets. 
This works by scanning the available datasets and selects recursively three elements for training 
and moving them to Tr datasets matrix, and then moving the fourth one to the Ts datasets matrix. 
The algorithm repeats the process until reach to the end of the available file. The available file that 
containing the training and testing dataset must be in DAT format as shown in Figure (4.9). 
 
Figure (4.9) Sample of Training Dataset File 
Table (4.3) shows the summery of available datasets which have been used in developing the 
models and containing the training and testing the datasets. 
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Table (4.3) Available Datasets with Tr and Ts Datasets 
Service 
Total Number of 
Datasets 
No of Training 
Datasets (Tr) 
No of Testing 
Datasets (Ts) 
IE 505 379 126 
Openwebmail 13 10 3 
Apache 587 441 146 
Perl 24 18 6 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter discuss the data profile and preprocessing approach before developing the soft 
computing model. The preprocessing data consists from four stages. The first stage is to collect 
the actual data of vulnerabilities for critical system. Those data consists from input-output datasets 
which are a webmail system and some related services such as Perl, Apache server and Internet 
Explorer. The next stage is to select the variables of the available data. In this stage we use the 
CVSS V2 standard to calculate the frequency and impact of each vulnerability as mentioned in 
methodology section in chapter one. The selected variables shown in Figure (4.4). Third stage is 
to formatting the selected variables to numbers. Those values conducting from CVSS metrics score 
as mentioned in chapter three. The last stage is used to avoid the over fitting problem by using 
cross validation algorithm. Computing the frequency and impact for each vulnerability conducting 
to IA risk level value of each vulnerability. Each system has more than one vulnerability. 
Therefore, the maximum IA risk level of the vulnerability it will be the IA risk level for the system. 
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Chapter Five : Development of Models 
5.1 Introduction 
The major contribution of this thesis is developing a model that assess the IA risk level based on 
the input-output historical available data. This chapter is concerned with NEUROFUZZY BASED 
MODELING TECHNIQUES. Several models have been developed such as, Sugeno with Hybrid 
optimization techniques, Subtractive Slustering, Subtractive Slustering with Hybrid optimization 
techniques and check the adequacy of the developed model to demonstrate their performance. 
Mamdani model was also developed for the first stage. 
Three measurement have been used to effectively check the adequacy of results, these measures 
are as illustrated below: 
1. Correlation Coefficient (CC) which measure the correlation between the actual and 
predicted risk. This measure will be between the actual values and between the predicted 
outputs from developed model and is calculated by (Rae'd Basbous and Arafeh): 
CCxy=√1 −
∑ (𝑦𝑖−𝑥𝑖)2𝑁𝑖=1
∑ (𝑦𝑖−𝑦)2𝑁𝑖=1
          (5-1) 
Where yi :  is the ith actual data, 
                     y: is the average of all actual data, 
                     xi: is the ith predicted data, 
                    N: is the number of data points under consideration. 
2. The Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), which is expressed error as percentage. 
MAPE is the average of the absolute difference between the actual and forecasted divided 
by actual. The MAPE is calculated by (McSharry,2006 as cited in Rae'd Basbous and 
Arafeh,2009): 
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MAPE = ∑ |
𝑦𝑖−𝑥𝑖
𝑦𝑖
| ∗
100
𝑁
%𝑁𝑖=1         (5-2) 
3. The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), which is used to evaluate the error (differences) 
between the forecasted and actual loads. The general form of the RMSE equation for the 
actual risk (Y) and the predicted ones (X) is given by (Oriqat,2007 as cited in Rae'd 
Basbous and Arafeh,2009): 
RMSE =
√∑ (𝑦𝑖−𝑥𝑖)2𝑁𝑖=1
(𝑁−1)
         (5-3) 
4. Percentage of differences. 
Percentage of Differences = ∑ |
𝑦𝑖−𝑥𝑖
𝑦𝑖
| ∗
100
𝑁
      (5-4) 
5.2 Sugeno Models with Hybrid Optimization Technique 
The models are to be trained with historical data before testing them. The first step for training 
model is obtaining an accurate historical data and should be relevant to the model. The following 
section under section 5.2 have several Sugeno-based models with hybrid optimization techniques 
were developed for each stage to produce the overall IA risk model. Figure (5.1) illustrates a 
general developing training block diagram for each stage of our models. It consist of two main 
steps: 
1. The first stage is pre-processing the input datasets for the system. For each stage we defined 
the inputs-outputs datasets that are used in the second step. 
2. This stage is concerned with sugeno models using hybrid techniques. The processed 
datasets have been used in developing all models. 
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5.2.1 Initial Frequency Sugeno Models with Hybrid Optimization 
Technique 
Hybrid learning algorithm (Jang 1993) and (Jang and Mizutani 1996) combines the Gradient 
Descent and the Least-Squares algorithm and it is the most widely used algorithm in literature 
to identify the parameters of the ANFIS. In this section we will import the data collection both 
the training and testing datasets to produce the Sugeno model for initial factor of frequency. In 
the initial stage we notice that each metrics in the initial frequency have a limited change in 
values such as the metrics access vector in base group have just three values (1,0.395,0.646) 
the same are for the other metrics, the access complexity and authentication. For this purpose 
we took all available dataset for the initial stage. All available data were 1129 record, after we 
applied the cross validation algorithm, two matrices were produced one for training with 847 
records and the other for testing with 282 records and both of them were loaded into ANFIS 
Editor. Figure (5.2) illustrates the FIS model. 
Pre-processed 
Training datasets 
Input-output files 
Sugeno-Based Models 
Define Model 
Parameter ( Type and 
No. of MF) 
Output Model   
Figure (5.1) General Developing Training Block Diagram for Sugno Model with Hybrid 
Technique 
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Figure (5.2) Initial Frequency FIS Model 
In order to obtain the best results from the developed models, the model parameters (type and 
number of membership functions) need to be updated and determined manually. We will set the 
number of the MF’s to 3 for each variable in the proposed model as the limited three values only. 
The type of MF’s will be defined as triangular shapes according to (Bouchon-Meunier, Dotoli et 
al. 1996) recommendation for a singleton. Table (5.1) shows the ANFIS parameter for initial 
frequency developed model and Table (5.2) shows the output from the ANFIS process. 
Table (5.1) Sugeno Model Parameter for Initial Frequency Developed Model 
Generate 
FIS 
No. Input No. output No MF’s Optimization technique Epochs 
Grid  3 1 3 3 3  Hybrid 100 
 
Table (5.2) ANFIS Result for Initial Frequency Sugeno Developed Model 
No. nodes No. linear 
parameters 
No. nonlinear 
parameters 
Total number 
of parameters 
No. training 
data pairs 
No. fuzzy 
rules 
78 108 27 135 847 27 
Figure (5.3) represents the inputs MF’s that have been used in building initial frequency developed 
model. For the initial frequency sugeno model a typical rule with three inputs (access vector, access 
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complexity, authentication) and one output (initial frequency), has the form (Arafeh, Singh et al. 
1999): 
If AV is AVj and AC is ACk and AU is AUl, then  
The initialfrequency = pi AVj + qi ACk +ri AUl + si ,     (5-5) 
Where (j) represents the AV (Access Vector) input MF, (K) represent the AC (Access Complexity) 
input MF, and the (l) represents the AU (Authentication) MF. The term pi, qi, ri, si, indicate the 
consequent parameters. For a zero-order sugeno model, the output level of initial frequency is a 
constant. The output level of initialfrequency1 of each rule is weighted by the firing strength wi of 
the rule. For example, for an AND rule with AV=AVj and AC=ACk and AU=AUl, the firing 
strength is (MathWorks 2008): 
Wi=AndMethod(F1(AVj),F2(ACk),F3(AUl)),      (5-6) 
Where F1,2,3(.) are the membership functions for AV, AC and AU. The final output for this stage 
is weighted average for all rule outputs (MathWorks 2008), as the following  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 =  
∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑁𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑁𝑖=1
           (5-7) 
ial  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Access Vector MF’s 
 
b Access Complexity MF’s 
 
c Authentication MF’s 
 Figure (5.3) Initial Frequency Inputs (Access Vector, Access Complexity, Authentication) MF's 
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Table (5.3) Results for Initial Frequency Models with Hybrid Optimization 
No. of MF No. of 
Dataset 
Testing Dataset 
CC MAPE RMSE 
3 283 0.9937 0.0035 0.0110 
As shown in table above, very good results obtained from the sugeno model with hybrid 
optimization technique. A CC of 0.9937 describes the agreement between the actual and the 
predicted values for the initial frequency model. In addition, small values for the two error 
measures (MAPE and RMSE) show the error using two different formulas. 
5.2.2 Initial Impact Sugeno Models with Hybrid Optimization 
Technique 
The same as the section above (initial Sugeno model) we used the available dataset and input-
output variable to obtain the initial impact Sugeno model using ANFIS with Hybrid optimization 
technique. We apply the same process as we applied above to produce the models. The dataset has 
1129 input-output record, then we apply the cross validation record to produce the training and 
testing matrices. We used the same parameter as listed in Table (5.1) and the result as listed in 
Table (5.2). Figure (5.4) shows the FIS model for the initial impact model. 
 
Figure (5.4) Initial Impact FIS Model 
As the inputs of initial impact model (C, I, A) have the same range of values which consist from 
three numbers (0, 0.275, 0.66), the developed model propose three MF’s for each as shown in 
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Figure (5.5) and Table (5.4) shows the results error for this model. The Figure (5.6) shows the 
initial impact FIS model. 
 
Figure (5.5) Initial Impact Model Input (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) MF's 
 
Table (5.4) Results for Initial Impact Model with Hybrid 
No. of 
MF 
No. of Datasets Testing Dataset 
CC MAPE RMSE 
3 283  1 9.33E-09 7.03E-09 
The table above shown, the CC value are equal to 1 which mean the value of predicted and actual 
values are equal and this represent the strength of this model. Despite of the CC value are equal to 
1, the error measures (MAPE and RMSE ) have a slight error which can be neglected. 
Figure (5.5) represents the inputs MF’s that have been used in building initial impact developed 
model. For the initial impact sugeno model a typical rule with three inputs (Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability) and one output (initial impact), has the form (Arafeh, Singh et al. 1999): 
If C is Cj and I is Ik and A is Al, then  
The initialimpact = pi Cj + qi Ik +ri Al + si ,      (5-8) 
Where (j) represents the C (Confidentiality Impact) input MF, (K) represent the I (Integrity Impact) 
input MF, and the (l) represents the A (Availability Impact) MF. The term pi, qi, ri, si, indicate the 
consequent parameters. For a zero-order sugeno model, the output level of initial impact is a 
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constant. The output level of initialimpact1 of each rule is weighted by the firing strength wi of the 
rule. For example, for an AND rule with C=Cj and I=Ik and A=Al, the firing strength is (MathWorks 
2008): 
Wi=AndMethod(F1(Cj),F2(Ik),F3(Al)),       (5-9) 
Where F1,2,3(.) are the membership functions for C, I and A. The final output for this stage is 
weighted average for all rule outputs (MathWorks 2008), as the following  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 =  
∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑁𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑁𝑖=1
          (5-10) 
 
Figure (5.6) Initial Impact Sugneo FIS Model with Hybrid Optimization Technique 
5.2.3 Updated Frequency Sugeno Models with Hybrid Optimization 
Technique 
This model used the temporal metric which measures the state of exploit techniques or code 
availability that may increase or decrease the severity of vulnerabilities. The temporal metrics 
(Exploitability tools, Remediation Level, Report Confidence) with the output from initial 
frequency model are combined in this model to produce the updated frequency model. The dataset 
used in this model consist from four inputs and one output, this datasets are divided into two 
matrices, training dataset with 848 records and testing dataset with 283 records. Those matrices 
are imported into ANFIS editor tools to produce the model with hybrid optimization technique.  
To generate the FIS we selected the 3 MF’s for each input of temporal metrics with triangular 
shape as each of them limited with three values only. The fourth input has a range from 1 to 10 
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with different values not limited like the temporal metrics with some values so we change the 
number of MF’s manually for this input to five to provide the best results. Figure (5.7) illustrates 
the updated frequency FIS Model. Whereas, Figure (5.8) shows the input MF’s with numbers and 
types, the initial frequency input have 5 MF’s and the 3 others (E, RL, CR) with 3 MF’s. 
 
Figure (5.7) Updated Frequency FIS Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Initial Frequency MF’s 
 
b Exploitability MF’s 
 
 
d Confidence Report MF’s 
 
 
 
 c Remediation Level  MF’s 
 Figure (5.8) Updated Frequency Inputs MF's Sugeno Model with Hybrid Method 
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5.2.4 Updated Impact Sugeno Models with Hybrid Optimization 
Technique. 
This model used the environmental metrics with the initial impact from base group. This model is 
asset-based which mean it depends on the needs capabilities for each asset in the organization. 
Suppose an email asset has a highly demand on availability and confidentiality but low demand in 
integrity on an organization so it needs to increase the availability and confidentiality requirements 
(AR, CR) and set those values with high and integrity requirement (IR) to low in environmental 
metrics. Whereas in other organization it is completely dependent on an email asset which mean 
the needs capabilities for email asset is highly demand in availability, confidentiality and integrity 
which needs to increase all requirements on to high. In this proposed model we assume a highly 
demand in C, A and low demand in I. The inputs MF’s illustrated in Figure (5.9). The 
environmental metrics limited with three values. Therefore the number MF’s are 3 for each with 
triangular shape as mentioned above for temporal metrics. Whereas the input of initial impact has 
a values ranging from 0 to 10 and not limited as the metrics values. Therefore we set the number 
of MF’s to this input to 5 to be more accurate. Figure (5.10) illustrates the updated impact FIS 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Initial Impact MF’s 
 
b CR, AR, IR MF’s 
Figure (5.9) Updated Impact Sugrno Model Inputs MF's 
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Figure (5.10) Updated Impact FIS Model 
5.2.5 Vulnerability Risk Sugeno Models with Hybrid Optimization 
Technique. 
In this model we combined the Updated frequency and impact to produce the total risk for each 
vulnerability. This model consists from 2 inputs and 1 outputs. The MF’s for each inputs are set to 
5 as the values are ranged and limited with some values as shown in Figure (5.11). The Figure 
(5.12) shows the Risk Level FIS Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Frequency MF’s 
 
b Impact MF’s 
Figure (5.11) Frequency and Impact Input MF's for Risk Vulnerability Sugeno Model 
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Figure (5.12) Risk Level FIS Model 
 
5.3 Sugeno Models with Subtractive Clustering 
The concept of data clustering is partitioning the dataset into several groups such that the similarity 
within a group is larger than that among groups. Clustering algorithm are used extensively not 
only to organize and categorize data, but are also useful for data compression and model 
construction. By finding similarities in data, one can represent similar data with fewer symbols for 
example. Also if we can find groups of data, we can build a model of the problem based on those 
groupings. The purpose of clustering is to identify natural groupings of data from a large data set 
to produce a concise representation of a system's behavior. According to Chiu in (Chiu 1996) 
subtractive clustering is a fast, one-pass algorithm for estimating the number of clusters and the 
cluster center in a set of data. In this section we used the ANFIS tools to find clusters in input-
output training data and to generate a Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system that best models the 
data behavior using a minimum number of rules. The same steps that have been followed in 
developing the models in the previous sections applied here. This models is a radius cluster-based 
that depends on the radius of the cluster. Figure (5.13) illustrates a general developing “training” 
block diagram of a subtractive models.  
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This model depends on the radius of cluster, therefore some of models in the next section may 
change this radius manual to produce the best results instead of finding the best number and type 
of MF’s as in the previous section in Sugeno models with Hybrid optimization. 
5.3.1 Initial Frequency Sugeno Models with Subtractive Clustering 
The same dataset that were used in Sugeno model with Hybrid techniques are used here. In this 
experiment, the radius ranging from 0.1 to 0.5 which is the default value used by mathlab fuzzy 
toolbox. It was noticed that increasing the value of the radius leads to decreasing the number of 
rules and to decrease the accuracy of developed model. As the limited values of dataset that we 
have, the number of rules ranging from 1 rule when the radius is 0.5  and to 2 rules when the radius 
ranged from 0.4 to 0.1. Also we notice that average testing error of FIS when the radius is 0.2 is 
0.17248 which is the smallest error. The FIS model is same as shown in Figure (5.2). 
Table (5.5) Results Error for Initial Frequency Model with Subtractive Clustering 
Value of radius No. of Rules Testing Dataset 
CC MAPE RMSE 
0.2 3 0.9927 0.0141 0.0118 
The CC for the subtractive model is equal to 0.9927 (agreement between the actual and predicted 
values) whereas the error measure of MAPE is equal to 0.0141 and RMSE is equal to 0.0118. 
Pre-processed 
Training datasets 
Input-output files 
Clustering Models 
The radius of cluster 
Output Model   
Figure (5.13) General Block Diagram for Developing/ Training Clustering Models 
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Figure (5.14) shows the inputs MF’s for each inputs, whereas each input has two MF’(AV, AC, 
AU). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2 Initial Impact Sugeno Models with Subtractive Clustering. 
For this model we apply the same dataset applied before in initial impact Sugeno model with 
hybrid. In this model the radius from 0.1 to 0.5 has the same number of rules which is 5 rules. In 
this model we choose the radius to 0.5. The MF of the input variables (C, I, A) is shown in.Figure 
(5.15). 
 
Figure (5.15) Initial Impact sugeno model with clustering Inputs MF's 
 
 
a Access Vector MF’s 
 
b Access Complexity MF’s 
 
c Authentication MF’s 
 
Figure (5.14) Initial Frequency Sugeno Model MF's with Clustering 
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As listed in Table (5.6), there is no major difference between the real values and the predicted 
outputs. 
Table (5.6) Results Error for Initial Impact Model with Subtractive Clustering 
Value 
of 
radius 
No. of 
Rules 
Testing Dataset 
CC MAPE RMSE 
0.2 3 1 1.06876E-14 5.48058E-15 
 
5.3.3 Updated Frequency Sugeno Models with Subtractive 
Clustering. 
The output for this model are 4 rules when the radius of cluster is 0.5. The inputs MF’s of this 
model are illustrate in Figure (5.17). 
 
 
 
 
5.3.5 Updated Impact Sugeno Models with Subtractive Clustering. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a E, RL, CR MF’s 
 
b Initial Frequency MF’s 
Figure 5.16 Updated Frequency Sugeno Model with Clustering Inputs  MF's 
 
 
A Initial Impact MF’s 
 
b. CR, IR, AR MF’s 
Figure (5.17) Updated Frequency Sugeno Model with Clustering Inputs MF's 
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5.3.4 Vulnerability Risk Sugeno Models with Subtractive Clustering. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Sugeno Cascaded Models with Subtractive Clustering 
and Hybrid Optimization. 
The purpose of cascaded model is to achieve a more accurate model. This model the same as above 
section (cluster model) but with using a hybrid optimization technique. Therefore the same steps 
that mentioned in the previous sections should be followed in building cascaded model. At first a 
sugeno model using clustering should be developed in the same way as mentioned in the previous 
section. After that the constructed model should be enhanced using the hybrid optimization 
technique as shown in Figure (5.19). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown above in Figure (5.19), developing a Cascaded model consists of two main stages. At 
first, the same training datasets have been used to construct a Sugeno model using Clustering. 
 
 
A Updated Frequency MF’s 
 
b. Updated Impact MF’s 
Figure (5.18) Vulnerability Risk Sugeno Model with Clustering Inputs MF's 
Pre-processed 
Training 
datasets 
Input-output 
files 
Clustering 
Models 
The radius of 
cluster 
Output Model    
Hybrid 
Optimization 
technique 
Update Model 
Parameter 
(Type, No of MF) 
Figure (5.19) A General Block Diagram for Developing/Training Cascaded Clustering with Hybrid 
Optimization 
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Then, Hybrid optimization technique has been applied to fine tuning the constructed model 
parameters to achieve a more accurate model. 
5.4.1 Initial Frequency Sugeno Models with Subtractive Clustering 
and Hybrid Optimization technique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (5.7) Results Error for Initial Frequency Model with Subtractive Clustering and Hybrid 
Method 
Value of 
radius 
No. of 
Rules 
Testing Dataset 
CC MAPE RMSE 
0.2 3 0.9880 0.008 0.0146 
 
 
a Access Vector MF’s 
 
b Access Complexity MF’s 
 
c Authentication MF’s 
Figure (5.20) Initial Frequency Sugeno Model with Clustering and Hybrid inputs MF's 
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5.4.2 Initial Impact Sugeno Models with Clustering and Hybrid 
Optimization technique. 
 
 
 
Figure (5.21) Initial Impact sugeno model with clustering and Hybrid Inputs MF's 
The same models are applying for updated frequency, impact and risk vulnerability using 
Subtractive Clustering with Hybrid optimization technique. 
5.5 Mamdani Fuzzy Inference Method. 
The second type of FIS method is using Mamdani FIS method which is the most commonly seen 
fuzzy methodologies. Mamdani’s method was among the first control systems built using suzzy 
set theory. It was proposed by (Mamdani and Assilian 1975) as an attempt to control a steam 
engine and boiler combination by synthesizing a set of linguistic control rules obtained from 
experienced human operators Mamdani’s effort was based on (Zadeh 1973) paper on fuzzy 
algorithms for complex systems and decision processes. Mamdani's method was among the first 
control systems built using fuzzy set theory. Another thesis contribution is to using the Mamdani 
method to present the vulnerability risk assessment model. To produce the Mamdani model of our 
system, steps must be defined before ranging from determining a set of fuzzy rules fuzzifying the 
inputs using the input membership function, combining the fuzzified inputs according to the fuzzy 
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rules and combining the rule strength and the output membership function. By using this method 
we apply the first model “Initial Frequency” by defined the inputs, outputs, and fuzzy rules, input 
output MF’s and compares with the other method we mentioned above. 
5.5.1 Initial Frequency Mamdani Fuzzy Inference Model 
We model an initial frequency model as a set of fuzzy attributes. The first attributes we will look 
at are the access vector (AV), access complexity (AC), authentication (AU). Some of the value 
ranges used to fuzzify them in this work correspond to the value definitions used in CVSS. This 
values are used to simplify the task of choosing appropriate values of attribute ranges, and also to 
capitalize on the expertise put into establishing these values. Figure (5.22) shows the input-output 
attributes membership functions. The fuzzy AV attribute is shown in Figure (5.22) (a). The 
“Local” attribute that lies between 0.36 and 0.41, but never exceeds 0.52. Similarly, the “Adjacent” 
access represents a linguistic value that is never below 0.47, but is most certainly between 0.604 
and 0.656 and never exceed 0.74. Similarly, the “Network” access represents a linguistic value 
that is never below 0.68, but is most certainly between 0.94 and 1. Figure (5.22) (b) shows the 
fuzzy AC attribute. The “High” terms represents a linguistic value that lies between 0.3 and 0.374, 
but never exceeds 0.4167. The same as for “Medium” and “Low”. The same as for the AU input 
attributes. For every fuzzy inference system (FIS), a fuzzy output variable has to be defined before 
any inference is performed. The above input fuzzy attributes are combined using fuzzy rules to 
give a fuzzy output values. The Figure (5.22) (d) shows the fuzzy output “Initial frequency” we 
define the output fuzzy as a smooth Gaussian MF in order to be able to distinguish between small 
inference differences.  
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We use if- then- rules to combine the attributes based on the linguistic declarations about the 
attributes. Rules can be given weights depending on the importance of a rule over others. In this 
model we defined 27 rules with equal weight. 
 
Table (5.8) Results Error for Mamdani Model of Initial Frequency 
No. of inputs Testing Dataset 
CC MAPE RMSE 
3 0.91373 0.080646 0.042078 
5.6 Simulink Model: IA Vulnerability Risk Assessment. 
We use the Simulink library browser to build our own Simulink systems that present the FIS model 
that we mentioned before. To simulate the four stage IA Risk assessment, a Simulink-based model 
has been developed as shown below. The overall Simulink model is shown in Figure (5.26). To 
 
 
a Access Vector MF’s 
 
b Access Complexity MF’s 
 
c Authentication MF’s 
 
D Initial frequency MF’s 
Figure (5.22) Initial Frequency Mamdani Model Inputs MF's 
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be clear the figure we divided it in more figures. Figure (5.23) shows the Simulink of frequency 
model which consist from two stages (initial and updated frequency). The initial frequency 
calculated from AV, AC, AU, whereas, the updated frequency calculated from initial frequency 
from the first stage combined with other three metrics E, RL, RC. 
 
Figure (5.23) Calculate Frequency Value used Simulink 
Figure (5.24) shows the Simulink of Impact model which consist from two stages (initial and 
updated Impact). The initial Impact calculated from C, I, A, whereas, the updated impact calculated 
from initial impact from the first stage combined with other three metrics CR, IR, AR. 
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Figure (5.24) Calculate Impact value using Simulink 
Figure (5.25) shows how to calculate the IA Risk level for one asset. The updated frequency and 
impact are combined to calculate the risk level for the vulnerability. All vulnerabilities are 
combined as input to Mamdani fuzzy system to calculate the IA Risk level for the asset. Figure 
(5.26) shows the overall Simulink model. 
 
Figure (5.25) IA Risk Level using Simulink 
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Figure (5.26) IA vulnerability Risk Assessment Simulink Model
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Chapter Six : Results and Discussions 
6.1 Introduction 
The overall model consists from three stages to produce a risk value for each vulnerability. These 
stages models have been developed based on FIS using different methods (Sugeno and Mamdani). 
Sugeno Models have been developed using ANFIS with different methods. Sugeno Model using 
Grid with Hybrid optimization technique have been developed, and finally Sugeno model with 
subtractive clustering with and without hybrid optimization technique have been developed. 
Different measures have been used to check the adequacy of the developed models for each stage. 
These measures including the CC, MAPE, RMSE and Percentage of Differences. 
For each stage, the inputs were defined and were used to develop the models as mentioned in 
chapter four. Different models using different methods and techniques have been developed for 
each model to obtain best results. The next section illustrates a detailed comparison and discussion 
about the developed models. 
6.2 Results and Comparisons between the Developed 
Models. 
In this thesis and using a sample of historical datasets profiles presented in chapter four, we have 
started by developing five sugeno models with hybrid optimization technique. These five models 
are used together to produce the overall system model. The overall model is used to predict the 
risk value for one vulnerability. Then all risks values of vulnerabilities for one asset are combined 
together as an input to final Mamdani model to produce the final IA risk level for those asset. 
Another five models have been developed by using the same datasets with a subtractive clustering 
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methods. Then the subtractive clustering with the hybrid optimization technique have been used 
to construct a cascade models. 
As mentioned in chapter five, the training datasets and models parameters (numbers and type of 
MF’s, number of rules, and cluster radius) have been fixed and used for proposed models. For 
example the initial frequency and impact model with hybrid have only three values, therefore each 
model has 3 MF to represent the values. Whereas the updated impact and frequency have a range 
in values, therefore each model of them have 5 MF to obtain the best results. By using subtractive 
clustering, the radius cluster in initial frequency model is 0.2 which obtain the best results. Whereas 
the updated frequency model with subtractive clustering method using 0.5 values of radius cluster. 
Figure (6.1) show the CC measures for results obtained from the developed initial frequency 
models. The figure shows the CC for testing datasets. It is clear from the figure that the best results 
obtained from the models that have been developed to predict the initial frequency using the grid 
partition. 
 
Figure (6.1) The Correlations Measures for Results Obtained from Initial Frequency Models 
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With hybrid optimization technique. These high CC values that have been obtained refer to the 
agreements between the predicted data and the original data. The CC for the developed model with 
hybrid equal to 0.993 which is close to 1. Table (6.1) lists the correlation measures for the results 
obtained from the developed initial frequency model. The results from the above figure can be 
noticed in the table. 
Table (6.1) The Correlation Measures for the Developed Initial Frequency Model 
Models Hybrid Subtractive Sub-Hybrid Mamdani 
Initial Frequency 0.993719 0.992753 0.988008 0.91373 
To have a solid conclusion, the other three measures have been used. We notice that when the 
CC value increased the value of MAPE, RMSE and percentage of differences decreased. The 
MAPE and RMSE have been used to examine and show the adequacy of the developed model 
and its outcome.  The error measures RMSE and MAPE give an indication how the performance 
of the developed models are. Figure (6.2) and Table (6.2) below represents a summary chart 
graph for the MAPE values calculated for results obtained from all developed models with 
different optimization techniques. As shown in figure below the MAPE values for hybrid model 
is the  
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Figure (6.2) The MAPE Measures Chart for inital Frequency Models 
Lowest one and this reflect the highest CC that achieved from these models as shown in the table 
listed below. Also we notice that the MAPE value 0.014 of Subtractive models has been furtherly 
reduced to 0.008 by cascading the subtractive clustering and hybrid optimization technique. 
Table (6.2) The MAPE Measures Table for inital Frequency Models 
 Models  Hybrid Subtractive Sub-Hybrid Mamdani 
Initial Frequency 0.003546 0.014155 0.00841 0.080646 
The other error measure values (RMSE) shown in Figure (6.3). This measures shows the adequacy 
of the developed models in addition to the MAPE measures. The same thing for the RMSE results 
as in the MAPE results achieved where the grid partition with hybrid optimization technique has 
the best results (the lowest RMSE values which equal to 0.011). Table (6.3) shows the results of 
the error measures RMSE for all models. These results are shown in figure below. 
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Figure (6.3) The RMSE Measures Chart for Initial Frequency Models 
 
Table (6.3) The RMSE Measures Table  for Initial Frequency Models 
Models Hybrid Subtractive Sub-Hybrid Mamdani 
Initial Frequency 0.011032 0.011868 0.014669 0.042078 
Another error measures values (Percentage of differences) shown graphically in Figure (6.4) and 
listed the values in Table (6.4). As noticed from table and figure below the smallest difference 
error values for initial frequency model by using hybrid technique which equal to 0.354. 
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Figure (6.4) The Percentage of Differences Chart for initial Frequency Models 
As we notice from the figure above that the measures of percentage of difference values between 
the real values and predicted values is above 1 where the other errors values below the 1. 
Table (6.4) The Percentage of Differences Table  for initial Frequency Models 
Models Hybrid Subtractive Sub-Hybrid Mamdani 
Initial Frequency 
Model 
0.35461 1.415472 0.840954 8.064565 
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Figure (6.5) All Measures Values (CC, MAPE, RMSE, Percentage of Differences) for Initial 
Frequency Models 
A graphical representation for the CC and error masures (MAPE, RMASE, percentage of 
difference) are shown in figures above. A relation can be conclude from charts above which is: an 
increasing in the CC leads to decrease in the error measures (MAPE, RMSE and percentage of 
differences). This chapter can be summarized by the following points: 
1. The developed grid partition model with hybrid optimization technique produced the 
highest results. The value of CC between the actual and predicted values equal to 0.993719. 
2. The developed Mamdani model has the lowest CC compared to the other models and 
similarly for the two error measures. The CC value for this model is equal to 0.91373. 
3. Finally, we can notice that the highest the CC the lowest the MAPE, RMSE and percentage 
of differences. 
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6.3 Comparison with Other Studies 
As mentioned in chapter two, plenty works can be found in the risk assessment field, but it is 
important to mention that different datasets and different approaches have been used in those 
works which make it difficult to compare our models and findings with other studies. The lack of 
data that we have obtained and the denied our request for real data from different organization will 
make it difficult to check the adequacy of our models and compare it with other studies. But we 
can compare as models and techniques that used. 
Rani (Rani 2013) has proposed a neuro-fuzzy approach to estimate the software risk in all stages 
of software development life cycle (SDLC). Firstly he used the fuzzy inference system with 17 
input risk attribute. The input attributes were identified by a fuzzy terms, rules and output. After 
the Fuzzy Inference system he created then Neural Network based three different training 
algorithms: BR (Bayesian Regulation), BP (Back Propagation) and LM (Levenberg-Marquardt) 
are used to train the neural network. This model is applicable only to software design during the 
software development life cycle. Whereas our model can be used for hardware and software 
vulnerabilities. 
Shameli and Shajari have presented in their study (Shameli-Sendi, Shajari et al. 2012) a practical 
model for information security risk assessment. This model is based on multi-criteria decision-
making and uses fuzzy logic. The proposed risk assessment is a qualitative approach according to 
ISO/IEC 27005 standard. In the proposed model, a fuzzy technique was used to connect expert 
opinion with linguistic variables. These linguistic variables reflect the expert opinions. In this 
model determined the likelihood and impact of each threat, effective criterions for their 
measurement have been considered. But the lack of quantitative data and the rapidly changing 
security environment makes it hard to derive accurate measures over such a long time-period and 
the risk value is expert specific. 
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Sendi and coauthors have presented in their study (Sendi, Jabbarifar et al. 2010) the FEMRA 
model which uses the fuzzy expert systems to assess the risk in organizations. The risk assessment 
varies considerably with the context, the metrics used as dependent variables, and the opinions of 
the persons involved. This model represents each risk with numerical values. The authors 
presented three steps to achieve the goal. The first step to identify the assets which uses a security 
cube to identify and classify the assets. Then list all potential threats applicable to these assets. The 
second step is to generate a list of asset vulnerabilities and risks. The final step is to calculate the 
effect risks which sing the fuzzy models. In this model the values for each asset is taken from three 
experts in terms of CIA triad and then calculate the average. But the lack of quantitative data and 
the rapidly changing security environment makes it hard to derive accurate measures over such a 
long time-period and the risk value is expert specific. 
Dondo has presented in his study (Dondo 2008) a fuzzy system approach for assessing the 
individual asset by calculating the potential risk exposure for the vulnerabilities associated with 
these assets. Then the analyzer can rank the vulnerabilities associated with the asset. This model 
was based on CVSS attributes which defined the CVSS attributes as a Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). 
The proposed method models the KRIs as a fuzzy variables based on a combination of experience, 
expertise, or historical input and defined the MF for each variable. Then combine all the identified 
KRIs into FIS to come up with a final risk value. The FIS determine the fuzzy risk value 
represented by its CIA components. The combination between the impact and likelihood of the 
attack will produce the final risk value. Finally, defuzzify the result back into a crisp value and 
compare the results for each vulnerability in order to rank them. The construct asset value (AV) 
was used to derive the risk level or risks to a system. The asset value (AV) is assumed given. The 
approach derives risk level based on the CVSS base metrics variables, a measure of time from 
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when the vulnerability was reported and the safeguards already in the system. The author applied 
fuzzy rules to compute impact (I) and likelihood (L) and derive risk level as: AV x I x L. This 
approach is similar to our model, but our model does not use fuzzy rules. Our model uses the 
temporal and environmental metric groups given in the CVSS to estimate the risk level rather than 
asset value and safeguard. Asset value is not always easy to evaluate and might be stakeholder 
specific. AV is not a generalizable variable, but rather context and stakeholder specific. Our 
models is based on CVSS, which is an open standard that also reveals the details behind the scores 
provided. Furthermore, CVSS is regularly updated and several information sources is taken into 
consideration when calculating the CVSS score. 
 
Houmb and Franqueira have presented in their study (Houmb and Franqueira 2009) a Target of 
Evaluation (ToE)  risk level estimation model that uses CVSS to estimate misuse frequency (MF) 
and misuse impact (MI), and from these derive the risk level of ToE. This is a general risk in which 
this model works on the level of vulnerabilities and is able to compose the vulnerabilities into 
service levels. The service levels define the potential risk levels and are modelled as a Markov 
process, which are then used to predict the risk level at a particular time. MF is estimated from 
attributes in the base and temporal metrics of CVSS and MI is estimated from attributes in the base 
and environmental metrics of CVSS. The base metrics of CVSS is used to establish the initial 
estimates of both MF and MI. MF is then made attack specific by adding in factors concerning the 
attack tools available, the existing security measures and the report confidence. For MI, the initial 
MI of a potential vulnerability exploit (attack) derived from the base metrics is made ToE specific 
by taking the relevant security requirements into consideration. An important factor to note for MI 
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is that there are no impacts of a potential vulnerability exploit (attack) if there are no relevant 
requirements. 
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Chapter Seven : Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Works 
7.1 Conclusions 
The general objective of this work is to calculate the IA risk level for the vulnerabilities that can 
be exploited by an attack and then affect the IA of the asset. To achieve this work we have adopted 
the soft computing and artificial intelligence approach to develop a system that predict the risk for 
each vulnerability that can affect the assurance and ability of the asset. After calculating all risk 
values of vulnerabilities, then the organization can maximize the security requirements to 
minimize the risk based on capability asset needs. 
In conclusion, it is mentioned that soft computing is an emerging approach which parallels the 
remarkable ability of the human mind to reason and learn in an environment of uncertainty and 
imprecision. While artificial intelligence approaches imitate human beings way of thinking and 
reasoning to get knowledge from the past experience and predict the future risk. 
A state of arts about IA risks has been presented in this thesis. The approaches of IA risk level can 
be mainly divided into two categories: Guidelines approaches and artificial approaches. In the 
guidelines approaches which are used by a checklist guidelines or a third party company. These 
approaches are used to assess the organization based on checklist guidelines which are very 
expensive and take a long time.  While the artificial intelligence approaches try to imitate human 
beings’ way of thinking and reasoning to get knowledge from the past experience.  Expert system, 
ANN and Fuzzy inference approaches belong to the artificial intelligence category. 
In our review of literature survey in risk assessment approaches we have found that various 
variables could be considered for risk assessment such as access vector, authentication, access 
complexity, remediation level, the availability and easy to use of exploitability tools...etc. other 
approaches used the experts opinion to assessment the vulnerabilities. This thesis used the 
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variables metrics of CVSS v2. This thesis is composed of two parts: historical data treatment, 
individual approaches proposed for risk assessment. The overall system composed of five models 
to produce the vulnerability risk value. Then combined all values of risk for each vulnerability for 
one asset to the final Mamdani model. 
The sample of historical data have been collected form NVD and used to develop and test the 
various models. The data collected are divided into two datasets one for training datasets and other 
for testing datasets. The training datasets are used to developing the models. The same training 
datasets are used to develop four models. 
Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) with different optimization techniques have been used to develop 
our models. Firstly we started by developing five models using ANFIS with hybrid optimization 
technique. Then we apply the same datasets to develop five models using ANFIS with Subtractive 
Clustering and cascaded model using the subtractive clustering with hybrid optimization 
technique. We also aplly a Mamdani fuzzy inference system to compare all models with each 
other’s. 
The adequacy of the developed models has been checked using the Correlation Coefficient (CC) 
to measure the agreements between the actual and predicted risk values. In addition three error 
measures were used namely, Mean Absolute Performance Error (MAPE), the Root Mean Square 
Error (RMSE ), and the Percentage of Differences to indicate the accuracy and the performance of 
developed models. 
While testing these models using the testing datasets that has been isolated before the training stage 
using the developed cross validation algorithm, the obtained CC between the actual and predicted 
values of risk for all developed models ranges between 0.91 and 0.993. The corresponding MAPE 
that ranges between 0.003546 and 0.080646 and RMSE that ranges between 0.011032 and 
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0.042078 and the Percentage of differences that ranges between 0.35461 and 8.064565. This 
demonstrate the adequacy of adopting these types of approaches to IA risk levels. 
It was noticed that the performance of the developed models has been improved by grid partition 
with hybrid optimization technique. This improvement is notices as an improvement in the 
obtained CC that results from the hybrid models which equal to 0.993 and compared to the CC of 
other models that ranges from 0.91 to 0.992 when developing the models using other optimization 
techniques. Also the hybrid developed model has the minimum value error of MAPE, RMSE and 
Percentage of differences than the other models that developing with other optimization 
techniques.  
7.2 Suggestions and Future Work 
Although we have obtained preliminary results, yet still the following recommendation proposes 
further contributions to researchers: 
1. Further investigation using more historical data and updated parameters of the models need 
to be performed to conclude the adequacy of these approaches. 
2. Build a stand-alone application that automatically discover the critical assets in the 
organization and collect all historical data for these assets from an online NVD by 
middleware interface that connect the stand-alone application with the NVD.  
3. Additional enhancement for this model is to develop this model to reduce the IA risk level 
for the critical asset. 
4. Trying to find more parameter that affect the IA level and applying those parameters in our 
models to find the adequacy of our approaches. 
5. Finally, it is worthy to explore the use of other different soft computing modeling 
techniques such as Genetic Algorithm.  
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Appendix A: Information Assurance Definition from Different Perspectives 
Reference IA definition 
Organization 
Type 
Security Goals 
(McCumber 1991) 
Presented a model of IA with confidentiality, 
integrity, availability (CIA) triad. 
 confidentiality, integrity, availability 
(Pub 1998) 
Five Pillars of IA: availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality and non-
repudiation 
 
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation 
(DOD 2002) 
Through a defense-in-depth approach that 
integrates the capabilities of personnel, 
operations, and technology, and supports the 
evolution to network centric warfare 
Government  
(Maconachy, 
Schou et al. 2001) 
Replace the CIA triad with five pillars  
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation 
(Boyce and 
Jennings 2002) 
"Information Assurance is one of the newly 
refined processes of information protection 
Academic  
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Reference IA definition 
Organization 
Type 
Security Goals 
that has evolved from computer security and 
information system security. 
(Sherwood 2005) 
Information Assurance is a discipline the main 
aim of which is to give confidence or certainty 
in information; to give belief that one can rely 
on data, knowledge, facts, and its meaning. 
  
(CSIA 2007) 
Information Assurance is the term given to 
management of risk to information. Effective 
IA ensures that the opportunities provided by 
new technology can be exploited to maximum 
benefit. 
Military 
Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability, Non-repudiation, 
Accountability, Possession, Utility, 
Authenticity, Auditability, 
Transparency, Cost-effectiveness, 
Efficiency 
(Peng Liu, Meng 
Yu et al. 2001) 
Information operations that protect and defend 
information and Information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, 
 
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation 
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Reference IA definition 
Organization 
Type 
Security Goals 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation. This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by 
Incorporating protection, detection, and 
reaction capabilities. 
(Tawileh and 
McIntosh 2012) 
a system to prevent the improper user, 
corruption or theft of the business’s 
information and information systems by 
internal users or employees through the 
derivation and implementation of appropriate 
policy, technical and disciplinary measures and 
trust mechanisms. 
 
Business 
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation 
(Tawileh and 
McIntosh 2012) 
A system to reap benefits through the 
interception, theft, misuse, corruption or 
Hacker  
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Reference IA definition 
Organization 
Type 
Security Goals 
manipulation of information stored in, 
transmitted through and processed by 
information systems by exploiting weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities in these systems while 
avoiding traceability and chances of being 
caught. 
(Tawileh and 
McIntosh 2012) 
A system to protect the integrity and privacy of 
private information stored in, transmitted 
through and processed by information system 
in order to avoid negative consequences and 
legal liability by implementing appropriate 
measures and practices. 
End user Integrity, privacy 
(Tawileh and 
McIntosh 2012) 
A system to assure information systems users 
that these systems will function as expected 
with regards to the protection of the 
Information 
system 
developers 
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Reference IA definition 
Organization 
Type 
Security Goals 
information stored, transmitted and processed 
by these systems by providing acceptable 
evidence that the system are built by 
knowledgeable people using sound 
development processes in addition to testing 
results that confirm the claims made. 
 
 
